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DAMAGES IN ACCIDENT CASES
Fleming James, Jr.*
L.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The principle of compensation
The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of
compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant's breach of
duty.' There are other traditional strains. Where the injury is intended,
or involves a wrong more flagrant than negligence, exemplary or punitive
damages are sometimes allowed (in addition to compensatory damages)
for the purpose of deterrence, and perhaps for vindication.' Where the
cause of action is complete without a showing of actual damage (as for
breach of contract, assault and battery, or trespass to land), then nominal
damages may be awarded even when the proof shows no actual damages.3
These other strains, however, play an insignificant part in accident lawat least theoretically.
The principle of nominal damages is actually insignificant here. The
substantive law applicable in this field makes actual damage a prerequisite
to plaintiff's right of action. This is true of the law of negligence, 4 and also
generally of modern strict liability whether derived from statute5 or
6
common law.
Exemplary or punitive damages play a somewhat greater role. In the
first place the law allows them in some cases on the fringe of accident law
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 656, for biographical data.

1 McCormick, Handbook on -the Law of Damages §§ 20, 137 (1935) (hereinafter McCormick) ; 1 Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Measure of Damages 1 29 (9th ed. 1912) (hereinafter
Sedgwick); 1 Sutherland, A Treatise on the Law of Damages §§ 1, 12 (4th ed. 1916) (hereinafter Sutherland).
2 McCormick c. 10; Sedgwick § 37, c. XVI; 2 Sutherland c. 9; Restatement, Torts § 903
(1939).
3 McCormick c. 3; Sedgwick c. VI; Sutherland c. II; Restatement, Torts § 907 (1939).
4 Harper, Torts § 129 (1933) ; Restatement, Torts § 430 (1934).
This notion is one of the obstacles to recovery in emotional disturbance cases. See Toelle,
"The Urban Case," 27 Conn. BJ. 74, 79 (1953), and more generally Magruder, "Mental and
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts," 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936).
5 Workmen's compensation acts typically provide for payment of medical expenses and
part of the actual wage loss during incapacity brought about by industrial accidents, after an
initial waiting period. "Temporary injury without incapacity is not compensable in most
states." Horovitz, Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws 260 (1944).
Death benefits are usually payable only to those who establish dependency in fact. See 2
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law cs. X, XI (1952).
6 Harper, Torts §§ 155, 156 (rule in Rylands v. Fletcher), §§ 182, 191 (nuisance) ; Restatement, Torts § 519C(1938) ; id. § 822 (b) (1939).
Some of the older forms of strict liability (e.g. trespass to land) afforded a remedy without
the showing of actual damage.
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where the wrong of defendant, or his employee, has been something graver
than negligence. 7 More important than this, however, is the fact that
notions of vindictiveness or deterrence may come in to influence, illicitly,'
the fixing of damages that are supposed to be compensatory, especially in
those areas where, as we shall see, the jury is given wide discretion in
determining their amount.
In spite of all this, it is probably still true that the cardinal principle
of damages in accident cases is-in fact as well as theory-that of compensation. We shall confine ourselves here to an analysis and appraisal of
this principle.
What then is compensation? The primary notion is that of repairing
plaintiff's injury or of making him whole as nearly as that may be done
by an award of moneyY The "remedy [should] be commensurate to the
injury sustained.""' "[W]hoever does an injury to another is liable in
damages to the extent of that injury."" Sometimes this can be accomplished with a fair degree of accuracy. But obviously it cannot be done
in anything but a figurative and essentially speculative way for many of
the consequences of personal injury. Yet it is the aim of the law to attain
at least a "rough correspondence between the amount awarded as damages
and the extent of the suffering,,,' 2 or other intangible loss.
The principle of compensation is a natural enough corollary of the fault
principle. If defendant is a wrongdoer and he is to pay damages to an
innocent plaintiff, it seems eminently fair that these damages should (at
least) put the plaintiff, as nearly as may be, in the same position he would
have been in if defendant's wrong had not injured him. So deeply does
this correspond to our natural feelings that the basic principle has been
taken pretty much for granted. Its validity in a system of liability based
on the personal moral shortcoming of him who pays the judgment may
well be conceded. Today, however, the trend in accident law is running
heavily towards diluting the requirement of fault for liability and the
defense of the victim's fault.13 Increasingly the personal participants in
7 See note 2 supra.
8 See James, "Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases," 58 Yale L.J. 667, 680
et seq. (1949).
9 Sources cited note 1 supra.
10 Rockwood v. Allen, 7 Mass. 254, 256 (1811) (Sedgwick, J.).
11 Dexter v. Spear, 7 Fed. Cas. 624, No. 3867 (C.C.D.R.I. 1825) (Story, CJ.).
12 Restatement, Torts § 903, comment a (1939).
13 See Ehrenzweig, Negligence without Fault (1951); Feezer, "A Circle Torn Through
Negligence," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 647 (1952); Gregory, "Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability," 37 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1951); James, "Inroads on Old Tort Concepts," 14 NACCA
L.J. 226 (1954), 15 id. 281 (1955); James, "Accident Liability: Some Wartime Developments," 55 Yale L.J. 365 (1946); Leflar, "Negligence in Name Only," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 564
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the accident-even where their fault is clear--do not pay the judgments
awarded. These are paid by absentee employers or by insurance com.panies and through them distributed widely over a large segment of
society.14 Accident law is approaching-perhaps by faltering stepsL---an
enterprise liability without fault. If such a system is to be justified, it
cannot be in terms of the personal ethical evaluation which gave rise to
the compensatory theory of damages. Justification must come, rather,
from the kind of considerations of social morality which led to workmen's
compensation. In this view the ethical evaluation of the conduct of participants in an ordinary accident situation is overshadowed in importance
by these outstanding facts: some classes of accidents are the inevitable
by-product of enterprises which can distribute such accident losses efficiently and broadly among the beneficiaries of the enterprises. These
accident losses fall initially on those who are ill-equipped to meet them;
and if the losses are not shifted from the initial victims, ruin and dislocation with widely unfortunate social repercussions will result. Social
morality and expediency therefore demand that these losses be met and distributed by the enterprises which caused the hazards that brought on the
losses, but only to the extent that this is necessary to obviate the evils that
call for the system of strict liability. After all, the payment and distribution of losses are burdens to all concerned in the process, and these
burdens should not be imposed on persons or classes of persons without
some reason, nor to an extent beyond that which the reason calls for. The
reason for strict liability here is to provide assurance that accident victims
will be rehabilitated, and that they and their dependents will be cared for
during the period of disability without imposing on the victims or their
families a crushing burden. The amount of damages measured by this
functional standard may be less than the compensatory damages provided
by the common law, especially since compensation is presently attempted
for many speculative nonpecuniary items. Even when we consider the
victim's pecuniary loss, we must remember that accidents bring a net
pecuniary loss to society as a whole-the social wealth and income is
thereby diminished-so that if the victim is made entirely whole, he will
fare better than society and will not himself share the economic burden
he is asking society to distribute. If social need is invoked to justify strict
(1952); Nixon, "Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation," 3 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 476 (1936); Searl, "Automobile Liability Law Development and Trend," 39
Bests Ins. News 583 (F. & Cas. ed. 1938).
14 See James, "Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance," 57
Yale L.J. 549 (1948).
15 The most complete integration of this thesis (with considerable emphasis on the faltering
nature of the steps) appears in Ehrenzweig, Negligence without Fault (1951). See also
Ehrenzweig, Full Aid Insurance (1954).
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liability without regard to moral fault, then the demands of that need
should measure the extent of the liability. In that context, what is fair
is only what is needed, though here as elsewhere in life too stingy a view
of the need might frustrate the meeting of it.-6
We have not of course altogether abandoned the fault principle in
accident cases. The administration of accident losses is in a transitional
phase marked on the one hand by very large occasional recoveries 7 and
on the other hand by inadequate recoveries for the many.18 This is unsatisfactory and inefficient loss administration. The problem calls for greater
assurance of the functionally necessary award but also for keeping all
awards within hailing distance of what is needed. If this is to be accomplished within the framework of common-law development, judicial decisions will have to recognize not only the need for progressively broadening
the basis for liability but also the importance of progressively adopting a
functional view of the amounts to be recovered.
The principle of single recovery
The common-law system provides a single lump-sum judgment in the
typical accident case, 9 although in some tort situations (continuing nuisance and continuing trespass) plaintiff may recover periodically for continuing damage as it accrues. 0
There are two important practical consequences of the single recovery
rule. For one thing it means that all damages, future as well as past, must
be taken account of at the time of trial. This in turn faces the tribunal
with the difficult and uncertain task of prophecy, with no chance for
second-guessing where the prophesy turns out to be mistaken or where
the parties have failed to present all items of their claims.
16 See Jaffe, "Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance," 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 219 (1953) (an analysis to which the present author is heavily indebted). Cf.
James, "Social Insurance and Tort Liabilty," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 537 (1952).
17 NACCA L.J., official publication of the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys, reports in each volume all verdicts or awards exceeding $50,000 currently
brought to their attention. See, e.g., 15 NACCA L.J. 415-28 (1955) (listing 3 verdicts in
excess of 300,000, one of which was reduced on appeal to $168,000. Id. at 417, 423).
18 See Corstvet, "The Uncompensated Accident and its Consequences," 3 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 466 (1936); James and Law, "Compensation for Auto Accident Victims; A Story of
Too Little and Too Late," 26 Conn. BJ. 70 (1952); McNiece and Thornton, "Automobile
Accident Prevention and Compensation," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 584 (1952) ; Columbia University,
Council for Research in the Social Sciences, Report by Committee to Study Compensation
for Automobile Accidents (1932); U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd., Work Injuries in the
Railroad Industry 1938-40 (1947).
19 Fetter v. Beal (Ferrer v. Beale) 1 Ld. Raym. 339, 692, 91 Eng. Rep. 1122, 1361 (K.B.
1699, 1702) ; McCormick 1 13; Sedgwick § 83(b), 84.
20 McCormick § 13; Clark, Code Pleading 486-88 (2d ed. 1947).
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Another important aspect of a single recovery is the burden it casts on
the successful plaintiff of wise investment and of providence, wherever the
recovery must be relied on to take care of future needs. In 1947 the Railroad Retirement Board published the results of a study of work injuries
in the railroad industry for the years 1938-40. As part of that study some
1700 employees and survivors were interviewed on how they disposed of
their settlement payments, which had been by way of lump sum. The
report concluded (on this point) that as to such settlements "their disposition is not generally such as to offer assurance of a stable substitute
for the loss of wages incurred in the severe and fatal injuries." 2
These features mean that the single recovery rule is often both capricious and inflexible in its operation so that damages in accident cases, even
where they are awarded and actually paid, often fail to do the job they
should if accident law is to perform its function of administering accident
losses efficiently in the public interest.
The obvious alternative to lump sum recovery is an award for periodic
payments such as those made under workmens compensation laws, which
are tailored to fit continuing needs 22 But such a solution, if desirable,
must come through legislation.
The rule of certainty
We have examined elsewhere 23 questions as to the sufficiency of proof.
There we saw that a plaintiff must adduce evidence upon each element of
his cause of action which (if believed) indicates more probably than not
the existence of a state of facts favorable to recovery upon that issue. If
he fails in that respect, plaintiff is not entitled to have that issue go to the
jury. He loses on it, as a matter of law. This rule is generally applicable
21 U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd., Work Injuries in the Railroad Industry 1938-40 at 176
(1947). This was a report to the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
pursuant to S. Res. 128, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
This conclusion is particularly significant in view of the stable and conservative character
of railroad employees. I know of no other study into this question.
22 See Shulman & James, Cases & Materials on Torts 454-55 (2d ed. 1952).
The periodic payment also has its pitfalls-e.g., its tendency to induce prolongation of
disability, either consciously or unconsciously. See, e.g., Shulman & James, supra (citing
medical authorities advising lump sum settlements for certain types of traumatic neuroses).
Cf. Kowalski v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 116 Conn. 229, 164 Atl. 653 (1933), and Note,
86 A.L.R. 961 (1933).
In order to provide flexibility in meeting this and sfinilar problems, most workmen's compensation laws give the board or commission discretion to commute periodic payments into
a lump sum award.
23 See James and Perry, "Legal Cause," 60 Yale LJ. 761, 762-74 (1951); James, "Proof
of the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res Ipsa Loquitur)," 37 Va. L. Rev. 179, 18593 (1951); James, "Functions of judge and jury in Negligence Cases," 58 Yale L.J. 667,
668-75 (1949).
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in the present field, both as to the fact of damage and as to the causal
relationship between defendant's negligence and each item of damage
claimed. 4 Certain peculiar aspects of the rule of certainty, however, as
it is applied to questions of damages, deserve special attention here. Some
of these are restrictive; others tend to ameliorate the harshness of restrictive rules; still others are more lenient towards the plaintiff than are
general canons of proof.
Foremost among the restrictive notions are those governing the question
of lost profits. Originally the speculative and contingent nature of profits
was regarded as a complete bar to their recovery in any case.2 5 Gradually,
however, came recognition that difficulties of proof and the speculative
nature of profits were not uniform for all situations; and the rigid prohibition has given way to a more flexible requirement of "reasonable
certainty."2 But there are still rules of thumb. Many states forbid an
estimate of such damages for new businesses,2 7 or for certain kinds of
businesses.28 Many refuse to put any value on a lost chance.29 Some
exclude consideration of events after the accident but before the trial
30
which remove much of the uncertainty that existed at the earlier date.
Another application of the rule of certainty, frequently invoked in
practice but less often noted, may be called "the rule of the floating sub24 See James and Perry, supra note 23; McCormick c. 9.
25 McCormick § 25; Notes, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 318 (1950); 7 Stan. L. Rev. 97, 111

(1954).
26 Sources cited note 25 supra.
27 Gibson v. Hercules Mfg. & Sales Co., 80 Cal. App. 689, 252 Pac. 780 (1927); States v.
Durkin, 65 Kan. 101, 68 Pac. 1091 (1902); Cramer v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 223
N.Y. 63, 119 N.E. 227 (1918); Walter Box Co. v. Blackburn, 157 S.W. 220 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913) ; American Oil Co. v. Lovelace, 150 Va. 624, 143 S.E. 293 (1928). But cf. note 30 infra.
28 See Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 320 (1950) (specifying "entertainment" and "liquor
sales").
Baumer v. Franklin County Distilling Co., 135 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1943) seems to
suggest such a broad rule for distillers. But the cases cited for the entertainment field
probably deny recovery for lost profits on the particular facts. Todd v. Keene, 167 Mass.
157, 45 N.E. 81 (1896) (one night stand of Shakespeare play); Broadway Photoplay Co.
v. World Film Corp., 225 N.Y. 104, 121 N.E. 756 (1919) (evidence of uniformity in greater
yield of first run pictures held lacking on facts); Camera v. Schmeling, 236 App. Div. 460,
260 N.Y. Supp. 82 (1st Dep't 1932) (single boxing match; Case analyzed in McCormick at
112). With the last case contrast Orbach v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 233 Mass. 281, 123
N.E. 669 (1919), allowing damages for loss of profits in similar situation on showing of receipts for year before defendant's breach, expenses of operation, and capacity crowds at competing theatre (which defendant supplied with films promised to plaintiff). Cf. also Narragansett Amusement Co. v. Riverside Park Amusement Co., 260 Mass. 265, 157 N.E. 532
(1927) (denying such damages on facts, and reviewing cases).
29 See, e.g., Kuhn v. Banker, 133 Ohio St. 304, 13 N.E.2d 242 (1938) ; McCormick § 31.
30 Cramer v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 223 N.Y. 63, 119 N.E. 227 (1918) (profits for
new business may not be based on profits made by it after period affected by defendant's
breach).
But cf. Treat v. Hiles, 81 Wis. 280, 50 N.W. 897 (1891).
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trahend." This comes in where a plaintiff has shown the gross amount of
expense or loss, but where defendant is not liable (by substantive law)
for all of the loss, or where it appears that certain credits or deductions
should be made against the total expense. In such cases some courts are
strict in requiring plaintiff to prove affirmatively the amount that should
be subtracted, before he can recover anything on account of the loss or
expense in question. Where, for instance, a negligent pedestrian was run
down by a trolley and then further injured by the motorman's negligence
in backing the car over him again, all recovery has been denied because of
plaintiff's failure to show how much of his total injury resulted from the
second impact for which alone defendant was liable 3 1 And where plaintiff
has shown the rental value of a vehicle to replace that damaged by defendant he has been denied recovery for loss of use because he failed to show
the cost of gasoline, oil, and depreciation which should have been credited
against the rental value.3 2 Cases in which plaintiff has shown the total
extent of a stream's pollution, but not the exact amount of each defendant's contribution to that pollution, present a variant of the present
33
problem.
Also restrictive is the insistence in many situations upon expert testimony as to the extent of injury, the prognosis, and the causal relation
between injury and accident.3 4 It should be noted, however, that the
artificial obstacles to producing such testimony in medical malpractice
cases 35 are not present in other types of accident cases. In the nature of
things restrictive requirements are apt to present more difficulties in
proving future loss than in showing the extent of losses already incurred.
There are rules which tend to counteract the strict operation of the rule
of certainty. One of these is the notion that the requirement will be
relaxed where the fact of damage has been established and the question
to be decided is the extent of that damage.3 6 Another is the maxim that
defendant will not be allowed to profit by his own wrong, so that if his
conduct not only caused damage but also contributed to the difficulty of
showing its extent he cannot complain if plaintiff comes forward with all
the evidence practically available to him under the circumstances, even
Deutsch v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 490, 119 Atl. 891 (1923).
New England Iron Wks. Co. v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 609, 120 At. 281 (1923).
33 See James and Perry, "Legal Cause," 60 Yale L.J. 761, 777 n. 61 (1951).
34 Id. at 769-71. Cf. Small, "Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in
the Concept of Causation," 31 Texas L. Rev. 630 (1953).
35 Doctors, especially those of the locality, are notoriously reluctant to testify against a
fellow doctor sued for malpractice. See, e.g., Reynolds v.Struble, 128 Cal. App. 716, 18 P.2d
690 (1933); Johnson v. Winston, 68 Neb. 425, 94 N.W. 607 (1903); Simon v. Freidrich,
163 Misc. 112, 296 N.Y. Supp. 367 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937); Coleman v. McCarthy, 53 R.I.
266, 165 At. 900 (1933).
36 McCormick at 102; Restatement, Torts § 912, comment a (1939).
31
32
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though it is less than would otherwise be required.37 Other similar
notions 38 reflect an increasing liberality in allowing reasonable inferences
to be drawn where the proof falls short of literal "certainty." Naturally
enough the tendency is greatest where the nature and impact of defendant's act is such as to make likely the kind of harm which plaintiff is
claiming 9
The requirement of certainty has relatively little application to nonpecuniary items of personal injury, such as pain and suffering °
Some minimum standards of proof as to the fact and extent of loss will
always be required. This would appear to be inevitable and proper under
any system for administering accident losses-or even under the broadest
kind of social insurance for all disabling illness and injury. The present
canons of proof which are broadly applied in civil actions do not on the
whole seem unreasonable. Some of the special aspects of the rule of
certainty in damages, however, appear to be unduly harsh and restrictive.
Moreover they tend to discriminate against those items of damage (pecuniary loss) which have the greatest claim to recognition, and in favor of
items which are harder to justify in terms of the modern social function
of accident law, and which afford the greatest latitude for caprice.
Avoidable consequences
As we have seen a plaintiff may not recover for items of damage which
are brought about by lack of reasonable care on his own part.41
There is also another side to this rule of avoidable consequences. The
plaintiff may recover for expenses, 42 or for property loss, 43 or for personal
37 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931);
McCormick 102.
38 See McCormick § 27; Restatement, Torts § 912, comment a (1939); Note, 64 Harv.
L. Rev. 317 (1950).
39 Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 320 (1950).
40 McCormick at 318; Restatement, Torts § 912, comment b (1939).
41 James, "Contributory Negligence," 62 Yale L.J. 691, 727-29 (1953) ; Restatement, Torts
§ 918 (1939).
42 United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 130 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1942) (expense of fighting
fire); Kleinclaus v. Martin Realty Co., 94 Cal. App. 2d 733, 211 P.2d 582 (1949) (expense of
draining off water); Goodwin v. Giovenelli, 117 Conn. 103, 167 Atl. 87 (1933) (expense
of plastic surgery to reduce scar allowed rather than damages for continuation of existing
scar); Smith v. Okerson, 8 N.J. Super. 560, 73 A.2d 857 (Ch. 1950) (cost of feeding cattle
when defendant's spray poisoned pasture); McCormick § 42; Restatement, Torts § 919
(1939).
As to the necessity or reasonableness of undergoing surgery to mitigate damages see Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal. 2d 54, 181 P.2d 645 (1947); Goodwin v. Giovenelli, supra; Ludlam,
"Plaintiff's Duty to Minimize Defendant's Liability by Surgery," 17 Tenn. L. Rev. 821
(1943); Note, 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 749 (1940); McCormick § 36. But cf. Lange v. Hoyt,
114 Conn. 590, 159 AtI. 575 (1932) (case of a Christian Scientist).
43 McKenna v. Baessler, 86 Iowa 197, 53 N.W. 103 (1892); 1 Sedgwick § 266j. See United
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injury," incurred in reasonable attempts to minimize the loss from defendant's conduct. The most common example is the cost of medical treatment
for an injury caused by defendant's negligence. Other examples come
readily to mind. If plaintiff's clothing and person are burned in the course
of reasonable efforts to check a fire negligently set by defendant, these
items may be included in the recovery."
If attempts to minimize the loss were reasonable at the time they were
made, they are a proper basis for assessing damages even though, in the
event, the attempts turned out to be unsuccessful and so to aggravate
rather than diminish the loss. 46
General and Special damages
In the law of contract there is a substantive rule excluding types of
damage which were not within the contemplation of the party to be
charged, at the time the bargain was made. Within the meaning of this
rule, general damages are such as would generally or normally flow from
defendant's breach and they are assumed to be before the minds of the
contracting parties. All other damages are "special," and for their
recovery, some specific showing must be made that facts indicating that
they might be incurred were brought home to defendant when the contract
was made. There is no corresponding substantive rule in accident law
generally, 48 although the restriction has been invoked in cases where
defendant's negligent act or omission also constitutes the breach of a contract between him and plaintiff or a third person, especially where the duty
of care with respect to that act or omission would not exist except for the
contract. Thus some states allow no recovery for personal injuries where
a landlord has negligently failed to perform a covenant to repair leased
States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 130 F.2d 308, 309 (4th Cir. 1942) (Court apparently sanctioned inclusion in possible recovery of "value of equipment destroyed in fighting the fire:") ;
same case on later appeal, 139 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1944) (judgment for plaintiff affirmed
without mention of this point).
44 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Siler, 229 Il.390, 82 N.E. 362 (1907); see United States v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 130 F.2d 308, 310 (4th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 139 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1944);
McCormick at 154.
45 Ibid.
46 Southern Hardware & S. Co. v. Standard Eq. Co., 158 Ala. 596, 48 So. 357 (1909);
Doolittle v. Otis Elevator Co., 98 Conn. 248, 118 Atl. 818 (1922); Ninth Ave. & 42d St. Corp.
v. Zimmerman, 217 App. Div. 498, 217 N.Y. Supp. 123 (1st Dep't 1926); Central Texas Tel.
Co. v. Allmand, 246 S.W. 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Restatement, Torts § 919, comments b
and c and illustrations 1, 2, and 3 (1939).
47 Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854); 5 Corbin, Contracts
§§ 1007 et seq. (1950) ; McCormick § 138; 1 Sedgwick §§ 144 et seq.
48 5 Corbin, Contracts 66 (1950).
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premises.4 9 And a few older cases denied recovery in warranty for
personal injuries caused by defective products. 5° Although the restrictive
rule is on the wane in the situations just described, 1 it has greater continuing vitality where plaintiff complains of the failure to furnish telephone or other similar service, to make repairs, 52 or to perform a construction or other similar contract.53 With these diminishing exceptions, the
substantive law of torts allows recovery for all damages, whether general
or special, which are proximately caused by defendant's tort. 4 And while
foreseeability plays a material part in limiting liability for negligence, yet,
as we have seen, plaintiff may recover for damages greater in extent than

appeared likely 55
For the purposes of pleading, however, tort law does make a distinction
between "general" and "special" damages. 56 But when this procedural
rule is invoked the meaning of the words "general" and "special" is not
synonymous with their meaning in the substantive contract rule described
57
above. The test here is simply one of fair notice from the pleadings.
The rule is that special damages, while recoverable under substantive law,
may be allowed only where specifically pleaded. In applying the rule the
terms "general" and "special" do not altogether have fixed or uniform
49 Cavalier v. Pope [19061 A.C. 482; Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397
(1931); 8 A.L.R. 765 (1920). See James, "Tort Risks of Land Ownership: How Affected
by Sale or Lease," 28 Conn. B.J. 127 (1954); James, "Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases,"
47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 778, 800-09 (1953).
50 Jones v. Ross, 98 Ala. 448, 13 So. 319 (1893); Birdsinger v. McCormick Mach. Co.,
183 N.Y. 487, 76 N.E. 611 (1906).

51 163 A.L.R. 300 (1946)

(" . . there is now a pronounced trend towards the view

that the landlord is liable for personal injuries under the circumstances.") ; cf. Busick v. Home
Owners Loan Corp., 91 N.H. 257, 18 A.2d 190 (1941).
Recovery for personal injury or property damage consequent upon a breach of warranty
of quality is now the rule, where other requirements of liability on warranty are met. 3
Williston, Sales § 614, 614a (Rev. ed. 1948).
52 See, e.g., Buskey v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 N.H. 522, 23 A.2d 367 (1941),
Note, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 185 (1942); Emery v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 271 N.Y. 306, 3 N.E.2d
434 (1936), Note, 46 Yale L.J. 167 (1936).
r3 Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co., 143 Wash. 547, 255 Pac. 939 (1927). But cf. Mooky
v. Martin Co., 76 Ga. App. 456, 46 S.E.2d 197 (1948). See James, Products Liability, 34
Tex. L. Rev. 44, 192 (1955).
54 5 Corbin, Contracts 66 (1950) ; McCormick c. 9, § 377.
55 In re Polemis &Furness, Withy Co., [19211 2 K.B. 560; Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co.,

190 Wis. 52, 208 N.W. 901 (1926); James and Perry, supra note 23, at 785 et seq.
56 Clark, Code Pleading 329-30 (2d ed. 1947); McCormick § 8; Restatement, Torts § 904
(1939).
57 Clark, Code Pleading 330 (2d ed. 1947) ; McCormick at 34, 35. Foreseeability comes in
here as it does in the contract rule but it is a different kind and must be judged from a
different point of time. The inquiry here is whether defendant's lawyer could foresee that a
certain line of proof would probably be offered at trial, from an examination of the allegations of the complaint, or amendment thereto, together with his knowledge of the local pleading rules and the judicial attitude towards procedural technicalities.
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meanings. They are relative concepts and will often vary with the circumstances of different cases, depending on whether the item of damage
sought to be proved is a natural and fairly uniform concomitant of what
is alleged.58 Thus if the complaint states that plaintiff's leg was cut off,
the permanent quality of that injury is apparent, and may be shown
though not specifically alleged. With respect to many types of allegations,
however, permanency is treated as special damage, requiring specific
allegation. 59
In spite of the relative and shifting meaning of the nature of these concepts, certain rules have been crystallized by the courts. The following
items are commonly viewed as special damages: expenses incurred in
efforts to minimize the loss; 6 loss of use of chattel; 61 past and future
loss of income (wages, profits, salary); 2 past and future medical, surgical,
hospital, and like costs; 6 3 other expenses incurred because of personal

injury or death (e.g., hiring of a substitute, funeral expenses); the more
unusual physical or mental consequences of the injury alleged, such as
66
Jacksonian epilepsy,64 disturbance of normal sex function, 65 insanity,
67
and the like.
Loss of value of injured property is general damage,68 but in all other
cases it is fairly safe to generalize by calling pecuniary loss special
damages. In personal injury cases, pain and suffering is general damage. 69
58 See the majority and dissenting opinions in Keefe v. Lee, 197 N.Y. 68, 90 N.E. 344
(1909).
59 Fournier v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 128 Me. 393, 148 AUt. 147 (1929); Gurmell v.
Jefferson City Lines, 239 Mo. App. 305, 192 S.W.2d 683 (1946); 68 A.L.R. 490 (1930).
But cf. Ehrgott v. City of New York, 96 N.Y. 264, 277 (1884) ; McCormick 38.
60 2 Sutherland § 420.
61 J.A. Mahlstedt L. & C. Co. v. Westchester El. R.R., 198 App. Div. 1021, 190 N.Y.
Supp. 932 (2d Dep't 1921); cf. Blakeslee Co. v. Rigo, 94 Conn. 481, 109 Atl. 173 (1920).
62 Tappin v. Rader Dairy Co., 119 Conn. 591, 178 Atl. 428 (1935); Eckert v. Levinson,
91 Conn. 338, 99 Ati. 699 (1917); Honaker v. Crutchfield, 247 Ky. 495, 57 S.W.2d 502
(1933); Kennedy v. Van Horn, 77 Okla. 100, 186 Pac. 483 (1920); McCormick 37; Restatement, Torts § 904, comment b (1939).
63 Honaker v. Crutchfield, 247 Ky. 495, 57 S.W.2d 502 (1933); McCormick 37; Restatement, Torts § 904, comment b (1939).
64 Baldwin v. Robertson, 118 Conn. 431, 172 Aft. 859 (1934) (but held allowable as "a
manifestation of the injury to the brain and the loss of brain functioning which is alleged").
65 Kane v. New Idea Realty Co., 104 Conn. 508, 133 Atl. 686 (1926); City of Hazard v.
Combs, 247 Ky. 728, 57 S.W.2d 669 (1933) ; _owers v. Westchester El. R.R., 179 App. Div.
938, 166 N.Y. Supp. 1110 (2d Dep't 1917).
66 McCormick at 37.
67 Galhaer v. Southern Harlan Coal Co., 247 Ky. 752, 57 S.W.2d 645 (1933) (aggravation
of injury by malpractice of doctor).
68 Brodsky v. Red Raven Rubber ,Co., 111 N.J.L. 453, 168 AtI. 440 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933).
69 Smith v. Whittlesey, 79 Conn. 189, 63 AtI. 1085 (1906); McCormick 35; Restatement,
Torts § 904, comment a (1939).
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II.

PROPERTY DAMAGE

Depreciationin Value
Where personal property has been injured or destroyed, the fundamental measure of damages is the difference between the reasonable
market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the
injury, at the time and place where the damage was occasioned.7 ° If the
property is totally destroyed, there is nothing to be subtracted from its
71
value before the accident, which will then measure the recovery. If
repairs are not practicable, but there is a salvage value, then the latter is
to be subtracted from the value before the accident, and the difference will
measure the recovery. 2
Difficulties are encountered where the property can be restored by
repair to substantially the condition in which it was before the accident.
In this situation three rules have emerged.7 3 Some courts still apply the
diminution in value rule, but allow the cost of reasonable and necessary
repairs to be shown as evidencing the amount of this diminution.74 Other
70 Rosenblatt v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 114 (E.D.N.C. 1953); Insurance Co.
v. Saltzman, 111 F. Supp. 694 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Adams v. Hazel, 102 A.2d 919 (Del. Super.
1954); Grant v. Dannalo, 87 Ga. App. 389, 74 S.E.2d 119 (1953); Hayes v. Dalton, 257
S.W.2d 198 (Mo. App. 1953); Kopischke v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 230 Minn. 23, 40
N.W.2d 23 (1950); Parilli v. Brooklyn City R.R., 236 App. Div. 577, 260 N.Y. Supp. 60 (2d
Dep't 1932); Pasadena State Bank v. Isaac, 149 Tex. 47, 228 S.W.2d 127 (1950); Stidham
v. Boyd, 258 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Cato v. Silling, 137 W. Va. 694, 73 S.E.2d
731 (1952); Notes, 169 A.L.R. 1074 and 1100 (1947), and earlier annotations therein cited;
Note, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 397 (1953); McCormick at 470. Cf. Restatement, Torts § 928 (1939).
See Continental County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ivy, 256 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)
(evidence of value of Texas owner's car in Texas not sufficient to show value in Alaska where
car was damaged).
71 Gass v. Agate Ice Cream Co., 264 N.Y. 141, 190 N.E. 323 (1934); Southern County
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Green Motor Co., 248 S.W.2d 959 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) ; McCormick 470;
Annotations cited note 70 supra.
72 Kohl v. Arp, 236 Iowa 31, 17 N.W.2d 824 (1945); Anderson v. Morgan City Canning
Co., 73 So. 2d 196 (La. App. 1954); Dorn v. Sturges, 157 Neb. 491, 59 N.W.2d 751 (1953).
73 Cases are collected in the Annotations cited note 70 supra.
74 Hawkins v. Garford Trucking Co., 96 Conn. 337, 114 AUt. 94 (1921); Kiely v. Ragali,
93 Conn. 454, 106 At. 502 (1919) ; Broadie v. Randall, 114 Kan. 92, 216 Pac. 1103 (1923) ;
Robson v. Zumstein Taxicab Co., 198 Ky. 365, 248 S.W. 872 (1923); Hayes v. Dalton, 257
S.W.2d 198 (Mo. App. 1953) ; Hintz v. Roberts, 98 N.S.L. 768, 121 Atl. 711 (Ct. Err. & App.
1923) ; Farrell v. Universal Garage Co., 179 N.C. 389, 102 S.E. 617 (1920) ; Ripley v. C. I.
Whitten Transfer Co., 135 W. Va. 419, 63 S.E.2d 626 (1951).
Variants of this rule are: (1) to allow the owner the diminution in value "subject . . . to
the proviso that if [the property] can be entirely repaired at a less expense than the diminution in value ... the measure of damages is the reasonable cost of repairs." Rhodes v. Firestone Tire & R. Co., 51 Cal. App. 569, 197 Pac. 392 (1921) ; (2) To allow the owner to prove
the cost of repairs as a substitute for diminution with the proviso that this cost "must not
exceed the difference between the market value of the car before and after the injury." Union
City Transfer Co. v. Texas & N.O. Ry., 55 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); cf. Stidham v.
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courts treat the reasonable and necessary cost of repairs as constituting
the measure of damages, subject to correction either way if the value of
the repaired article is greater or less than the value before the injury, and
subject to the limitation that the cost of repairs and other allowable
expenses may not in the aggregate exceed the value of the article before
the accident.7 5 The third rule, adopted by some courts 76 and the American
Law Institute,77 would give plaintiff an option to recover either the
diminution in value or the reasonable and necessary cost of repairs. In
many cases the rules will yield the same practical result, and partly
because of this the reasoning of the cases is often confusing and the status
of the rule uncertain.7 8 But the different paths will not always lead to the
Boyd, 258 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Chicago, R.I. & G. Ry. v. Zumwalt, 239 S.V.
912 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922). Cf. Johnson v. Scholz, 276 App. Div. 163, 93 N.Y.S.2d
334 (2d Dep't 1949) (plaintiff may have diminution or cost of repairs, "whichever is the
lesser.").
If cost of repairs is offered as evidence under this rule it should be coupled with evidence
that: (1) the repairs were necessitated by the accident and their cost was reasonable; and that
(2) either (a) the repairs restored the property to the same condition it was in before the
accident, and no more, or (b) the difference between the value of the repaired article and
value of the article before the injury. Merchant Shippers Ass'n v. Kellogg Express & D. Co.,
28 Cal. 2d 594, 170 P.2d 923 (1946) (plaintiff allowed cost of repairs plus difference between
value before injury and value after repairs); Gulan v. Gabriel, 349 Ill. App. 462, 111 N.E.2d
878 (1953) (evidence sufficient); Parilli v. Brooklyn City R.R., 236 App. Div. 577, 260 N.Y.
Supp. 60 (2d Dep't 1932) (evidence insufficient); Hayes v. Dalton, supra (stating same rule
as applied in Kellogg Express Co. case supra). Cf. Pfingsten v. Westenhaver, 39 Cal. 2d 12,
244 P.2d 395 (1952) (if plaintiff shows cost of necessary repairs, defendant has burden of
showing any enhancement over pre-accident value of article) ; Pasadena State Bank v. Isaac,
149 Tex. 47, 228 S.W.2d 127 (1950). In New York apparently if the repairs restore an automobile to a physical condition like that before the injury, plaintiff may recover nothing for
depreciation in value of the repaired article-a completely unjustifiable limitation. See Johnson v. Scholz, supra; Home v. Johnston, 220 App. Div. 170, 221 N.Y. Supp. 516 (4th Dep't
1927).
75 Kohl v. Arp, 236 Iowa 31, 17 N.W.2d 824 (1945); McAlister v. McNown, 174 Kan.
608, 258 P.2d 309 (1953); Helin v. Egger, 121 Neb. 727, 238 N.W. 364 (1931).
78 Kopischke v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 230 Minn. 23, 40 N.W.2d 834 (1950); Copadio
v. Haymond, 94 N.H. 103, 47 A.2d 120 (1946) ; Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa. Super. 430, 62 A.2d 75
(1948); Holt v. Pariser, 161 Pa. Super. 315, 54 A.2d 89 (1947). Cf. Parilli v. Brooklyn City
R.R., 236 App. Div. 577, 260 N.Y. Supp. 60 (2d Dep't 1932) (suggesting the existence of
alternative methods. But other New York cases would make plaintiff take the smaller
amount. Note 74 supra) ; and the California and Texas cases cited note 74 supra (suggesting
alternative methods with similar limitation).
77 Restatement, Torts § 928 (1939). The option rule is and should be limited to cases
where "after the harm it appears to be economical to repair the chattel." Presumably this
would not usually be the case where restoration was physically possible but would cost "more
than the exchange value of the chattel before the harm." Id. comment a. But there should be
no hard and fast rule. If repairs turn out to be more expensive than the estimate because of
unforeseen difficulties, the owner should get full compensation for his reasonable outlay though
it exceeds the pre-accident value of the article. Cf. note 81 infra.
78 Gass v. Agate Ice Cream Co., 264 N.Y. 141, 190 N.E. 323 (1934); Parilli v. Brooklyn
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same end. Where, for instance, the diminution in value is greater than the
cost of repairs (a common situation) the first rule will allow greater
recovery than would the second, if narrowly applied.7 9 Where the cost of
repairs exceeds the diminution in value, the second rule is more generous
than the first." And where the cost of repairs, loss of use, and incidental
expenses together exceed the value of the property before the accident,
the limitation usually found in the second rule will keep the recovery
below what it would be under any rule which did not have such limitation." The third rule seems best calculated both to afford an owner full
compensation for the pecuniary loss he actually incurs and to encourage
him to take active reasonable steps to minimize the loss. The adoption
of either the first or the second rule, on the other hand, throws on the
injured owner "the risk of reasonable but unsuccessful attempts to
repair.""2 Thus it would discourage such attempts wherever there was a
City R.R., 236 App. Div. 577, 260 N.Y. Supp. 60 (2d Dep't 1932); Howe v. Johnston, 220
App. Div. 170, 221 N.Y. Supp. 516 (4th Dep't 1927).
In a recent case the majority of the court read these precedents one way, a concurring
justice another way, a dissenting justice still a third way. Johnson v. Scholz, 276 App. Div.
163, 93 N.Y.S.2d 334 (2d Dep't 1949).
79 If, for instance, plaintiff is limited to the cost of repairs which restore the article to its
former physical condition even where the repaired article has suffered a depredation in
market value because of the repair, the owner has suffered an uncompensated loss which he
would not under the first rule. See New York cases cited note 74 supra.
If, on the other hand, this depredation in value is added to the cost of repairs, this
difference between the rules tends to disappear. See, e.g., Merchants Shippers Ass'n v. Kellogg
Express & D. Co., 28 Cal. 2d 594, 170 P.2d 923 (1946) (Cost of repairs measures damage only
where article "can be entirely repaired .... This . . .rule presupposes that the damaged
property can be restored to its former state with no depredation in its former value.");
Chicago, R.I. & G. Ry. v. Zumwalt, 239 S.W. 912 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922); Note, 7 Ark.
L. Rev. 397, 398 (1953).
80 See Union City Transfer Co. v. Texas & N.O. Ry., 55 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932);
White v. Beaumont Implement Co., 21 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (". . . the bill
for the repairs must not exceed the difference in the market value of the car before and after
the accdent"). The court's citation of authority, Robson v. Zumstein Taxicab Co., 198 Ky.
365, 248 S.W. 872 (1923), suggests that it may have confused the rule stated with the different
rule which forbids a plaintiff recovery for any increase over pre-accident value which the
repairs may have given the property. Even where repairs do not enhance the article's former
value, their cost may still exceed the diminution in value caused by the injury. See, e.g.,
Gass v. Agate Ice Cream Co., 264 N.Y. 141, 190 N.E. 323 (1934); Notes, 169 A.L.R. 1074,
1086 (1947); Notes, 169 A.L.R. 1100, 1114 (1947).
The second rule refuses recovery for the cost of repairs in excess of the article's total preaccident value, but will allow the repair cost to exceed the diminution in value.
81 Doolittle v. Otis Elevator Co., 98 Conn. 248, 118 Atl. 818 (1922) (Damages for injury
to car plus loss of use might "exceed the reasonable market value of the car."); Holt v.
Pariser, 161 Pa. Super. 315, 54 A.2d 89 (1947) (cost of repairs and loss of use properly
allowed even though pre-acddent value not shown).
This rule is and should be limited by the rule forbidding recovery of reasonably avoidable
consequences.
82 See Restatement, Torts § 928, comment a (1939).
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chance they might involve the plaintiff in loss. Such a restrictive rule is
at variance with principles generally applied to efforts to avoid injurious
consequences of a defendant's conduct.8 3 These general principles do,

however, warrant limiting a plaintiff's option where he has actually fully
restored the article, both as to condition and value. In such a case the
cost of repairs (plus loss of use and other proper expenses) should limit
84

his recovery.
Under all the rules described above, reasonable market value is the
general standard. 85 But it is not always the starting point for measuring
damages. "While the market value of the property is generally found to
provide adequate compensation to the owner, yet there are cases in which
such market value does not indicate the real value to the owner, and others
where the property has no real 'market value.' "86 "Household goods, such
as furniture, bedding, and wearing apparel, kept for use and not for
sale"8 7 fall within the first of these exceptions. So, under some cases,
would property devoted to a special use by the owner where there was no
market for the property for that use.8 8 In such cases the owner will be

allowed to show other factors, such as replacement cost and depreciation
which tend to indicate its economic (but not its sentimental) value to
89
him.
Loss of use and other expenses
Where repairs to the damaged chattel are practical and are in fact
made, the majority of American courts allow damages for loss of use
during the time reasonably required to make such repairsY ° Where the
article is wholly destroyed or where repairs are not practicable, however,
most courts refuse to allow any recovery for lost use.9 ' Such blanket
83 Id. § 919, comment b, illustrations 2 and 3, comment c.
84 Cf. Rhodes v. Firestone Tire & R. Co., 51 Cal. App. 569, 197 Pac. 392 (1921).
85 McCormick § 44; Sedgwick c. XIII; 4 Sutherland §§ 1098-99; Restatement, Torts,
§ 911 (1939).
86 Alfred Atmore Pope Foundation v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 106 Conn. 423, 432, 138
AtI. 444, 447 (1927); cf. Restatement, Torts § 911, and comments e and f (1939).
87 Birmingham Ry., L. & P. Co. v. Hinton, 157 Ala. 630, 632, 47 So. 576 (1908).
88 In Alfred Atmore Pope Foundation v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 106 Conn. 423, 138
AtI. 444 (1927), the owner was allowed the value of forest land for school purposes for which
it had actually been purchased, and was not limited to its value for ordinary purposes, namely
for timber, cordwood, fuel and for conservation of the soil, ponds, and streams.
Other examples, suggested by Restatement, Torts § 911, comment e (1939), are "a personal record or manuscript, an artificial eye or a dog trained only to obey one master ....
89 McCormick p. 170; Restatement, Torts § 911 comments e and f (1939).
90 See cases collected in 169 A.L.R. 1074, 1087 et seq. (1947) (commercial vehicles);
169 A.L.R. 1100, 1117 et seq. (1947) (pleasure automobiles); and earlier annotations therein
cited; Restatement, Torts § 928(b) (1939).
91 Kohl v. Arp, 236 Iowa 31, 17 N.W.2d 824 (1945); Helin v. Egger, 121 Neb. 727, 238
N.W. 364 (1931) ; Missouri P.R.R. v. Quails, 120 Okla. 49, 250 Pac. 774 (1926).
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refusal scarcely seems justified. The plaintiff loses the use of property
during the time it takes to get a replacement just as surely as he does while
it is being repaired. The principle of compensation demands recompense

in the one case as in the other, subject (in both cases) to the rule of
reasonably avoidable consequences. 2
Other limitations are also occasionally placed on attempts to recover

for loss of use. Some courts refuse to allow this item where plaintiff seeks
to measure his recovery by diminution in value (rather than cost of
repairs) even where the article has been repaired? 3 Others allow the item
only where the article is used in business or for profit.9 4 Arkansas refuses
to allow recovery for loss of use in any casesY 5 The weight of American
authority rejects all the limitations listed in this paragraph."
Where damages for loss of use are allowed, they may be proven by
showing: what plaintiff actually paid for a substitute vehicle; 97 what the

fair rental value of such a vehicle was; 9 8 or what profit or income was
actually earned by the damaged vehicle before the accident 9
Where damages for loss of use are allowed, they will be measured by
the time reasonably necessary for repairs, including the time needed to
get parts for the job. °°
Various other items of expense, such as telephone charges and hotel
bills necessitated by the injury to property, ought to be allowed in addition to damages for the loss in value of the article itself and for loss of
92 See Notes, 169 A.L.R. 1074, 1094 (1947). Cf. Glass v. Miller, 51 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio
App. 1940) (where truck repairable, but owner turned it in on new one, he is entitled to
damages for loss of use for time for repairs or for time to get new one, whichever should be
the shorter period).
93 Johnson v. Scholz, 276 App. Div. 163, 93 N.Y.S.2d 334 (2d Dep't 1949); Howe v.
Johnston, 220 App. Div. 170, 221 N.Y. Supp. 516 (4th Dep't 1927).
94 Hunter v. Quaintance, 69 Colo. 28, 168 Pac. 918 (1917).
95 Insurance Co. v. Saltzman, 111 F. Supp. 694 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Kane v.
Carper-Dover Merc. Co., 206 Ark. 674, 177 S.W.2d 41 (1944); Note, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 397
(1953) ("Apparently damages for such loss can be recovered in all jurisdictions except
Arkansas.").
96 For cases allowing recovery for diminution of value and loss of use, see Anderson v.
Gengras Motors, 141 Conn. 688, 109 A.2d 502 (1954); Adams v. Hazel, 102 A.2d 919 (Del.
Super. 1954); Kopischke v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 230 Minn. 23, 40 N.W.2d 834 (1950);
Notes, 169 AL.R. 1074, 1095 (1947); Notes, 169 A.L.R. 1100, 1117 (1947) and its predecessors collect cases wherein loss of use was allowed for pleasure vehicles.
97 Bauer v. Armour & Co. 84 Pa. Super. 174 (1924); cases collected in 169 A.L.R. 1074,
1092 (1947) and 169 A.L.R. 1100, 1119 (1947).
98 Anderson v. Gengras Motors, 141 Conn. 688, 109 A.2d 502 (1954).
99 Kopischke v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 230 Minn. 23, 40 N.W.2d 834 (1950).
100 Brooks Transportation Co. v. McCutcheon, 154 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Kohl v.
Arp, 236 Iowa 31, 17 N.W.2d 824 (1945) (where unusual time required to get parts);
Hermes v. Markham, 78 N.D. 268, 60 N.W.2d 267 (1953); cases collected in 169 A.L.R.
1074, 1090 (1947) and 169 A.L.R. 1100, 1119 (1947) (general treatment).
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use.'' Where an item is properly a part of the cost of repairs, however,
e.g., towing charges, it should not be added to the diminution in the
article's value (where that is taken as the measure), but it should be
added to the cost of repairs (where that is accepted either as the measure
itself or evidence of diminution in value).2
Some states allow interest on the amount representing
diminution in
10 3
value or cost of repairs, from the time of injury.
III.

PERSONAL INJURIES

Loss of earnings or earning capacity
Compensatory damages for personal injury are allowed for pecuniary
losses and also for such non-pecuniary losses as mental and physical
distress. Pecuniary losses include loss of earning capacity or earnings,
other specific harm resulting to property or business, and reasonable
medical and other expenses.
The simplest case is that of a plaintiff who was earning wages or a
salary when he was injured. If injury resulted in total or partial incapacity to work, plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount of earnings lost
for this reason up to the time of trial plus the present value of probable
future lost earnings during the estimated period of disability resulting
from the injury. If plaintiff's incapacity is or probably will be partial
(rather than total) for any or all of its duration, defendant is entitled to
have deducted the amounts which plaintiff earns or reasonably could earn
during the period of partial disability.'
For reasons that are not entirely satisfactory, defendant is not entitled
to any deduction for wages or salary actually paid plaintiff during his
total disability (whether voluntarily or pursuant to contract), for the
proceeds of accident insurance, or for disability benefits payable under a
private or governmental scheme. The rule forbidding such deductions is
often called the "collateral source" rule. With the increase of social insurance schemes it will pose increasing problems, and its re-evaluation
deserves separate treatment.0 5
In determining past and future loss of earning capacity the question
is not whether plaintiff would have worked, by choice. He is entitled to
101 See broad statements in Universal Carloading & Dist. Co.

v. McCall, 107 Ind.

App. 479, 25 N.E.2d 253 (1940); Chattanooga Ice Del. Co. v. George F. Burnett Co., 24
Tenn. App. 535, 147 S.W.2d 750 (1940). But contrast Insurance Co. v. Saltzman,
111 F. Supp. 694 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
102 Notes, 169 A.L.R. 1074, 1098 (1947); Notes, 169 A.L.R. 1100, 1120 (1947).
103 McCormick at 220, 221; Restatement, Torts § 913 (1939).
-04 Restatement, Torts § 924 (1939); McCormick §§ 86, 87; 2 Sedgwick c. XX.
105 See James, "Social Insurance and Tort Liability; The Problem of Alternative Remedies," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 537 (1952).
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compensation for his lost capacity'"6 to earn, whether he would have
chosen to exercise it or not. On the other hand factors which would bear
on actual capacity such as plaintiff's probable health (without the injury),
his habits and skill, the condition of the labor market, the chance of
advancement or of being laid off, and the like, are all entitled to
consideration. 10 7
If incapacity has persisted to the time of trial, its probable future duration must be taken into account. 08 If it is permanent, then the hypothetical duration of plaintiff's lost earning capacity will be the proper
measure.0 9 And in all cases of present allowance for future loss the
defendant is entitled to a discount for the advance payment. 10
If the plaintiff was not actually earning anything at the time of his
injury, or if his earnings then fell demonstrably short of his earning
capacity, the matter is necessarily speculative. Yet in such cases courts
have often allowed juries to use their judgment (in effect, that is, to
speculate) on the basis of whatever evidence is available. They regularly
106 There is some authority for regarding the recovery of earnings as such as an alternative

basis of recovery. Often it would make no difference which theory is adopted since the loss
of actual earnings is accepted as evidence of loss of earning capacity. Where the plaintiff's
actual earnings, however, are shown to exceed the reasonable value of his services, then the
actual earnings theory would allow greater recovery than the earning-capacity theory. See
McKenna v. Citizens' Natural Gas Co., 201 Pa. 146, 50 Atl. 922 (1902). If such earnings
were real and bona fide, they would appear to represent the amount of plaintiff's actual loss.
See McCormick p. 310; Articles 6 Okla. L. Rev. 289, 367 (1953); 7 Stan. L. Rev. 97, 101
(1954).
107 Nelson Creek Coal Co. v. Bransford, 201 Ky. 778, 258 S.W. 289 (1924); Norris v.
Elmdale Elevator Co., 216 Mich. 548, 185 N.W. 696 (1921); Bartlebaugh v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 78 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio App. 1948), modified, 150 Ohio St. 387, 82 N.E.2d 853 (1948);
Restatement, Torts § 924, comment to clause (b) (1939).
108 See page 585 supra.
109 This would have been terminated by retirement rather than death. Wetherbee v. Elgin
J. & E. Ry., 191 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1951); Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295 (9th
Cir. 1949).
If the injury shortens plaintiff's life expectancy, the weight of American authority nevertheless computes future earning loss on the basis of the life expectancy plaintiff would have had
without the injury. Prairie Creek Coal Co. v. Kittrell, 106 Ark. 138, 153 S.W. 89 (1912);
Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196, 55 N.W.2d 643 (1952) ; West v. Boston & M. R.R., 81
N.H. 522, 129 AUt. 768 (1925); McCormick at 303. Contra, Hughes v. Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry., 150 Iowa 232, 129 N.W. 956 (1911); Harris v. Bright's Asphalt Contractors, Ltd.,
[1953] 1 All E.R. 395 (Q.B.), which compute such losses on the life expectancy as shortened
by the accident. The prevailing American rule tends to over-compensate plaintiff, since no
deduction is made for his living expenses between the time of his death and the time he
would have died if he had not been injured. The contrary rule, however, leads to undercompensation since plaintiff's dependents will suffer a loss of support during the years cut off the
plaintiff's life. If a choice must be made between these alternatives, the prevailing American
rule offers the lesser evil. For suggestion of an intermediate solution see Note, 22 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 505 (1955).
110 Restatement, Torts § 924, comment d (1939).
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do so as to the probable future earning capacity of a child 11 and probably
most courts do in the case of a housewife," 2 even without specific evidence
of the value of such capacity. The fact that plaintiff was not actually
employed when injured does not preclude recovery for loss of earning
capacity if he can show some basis for a finding that he probably could
have been gainfully employed during the period he was incapacitated and
for estimating his probable earnings."3 Moreover a plaintiff may have
damages for impairment of his ability to take care of himself." 4
Where plaintiff is self-employed, so that his earnings depend on fees or
profits, he is more apt to run afoul of the "rule of certainty," as we have
seen." 5 Today, however, his obstacles are not severe if his professional
standing or his business is a fairly well established one."' He is then
generally allowed to prove loss of earnings (or earning capacity) by
showing his income before and after the injury. There is an exception to
this where the profit from a business is substantially due to the capital
invested or to the labor of others, rather than to plaintiff's own efforts."'
11 Girard v. Irvine, 97 Cal. App. 377, 275 Pac. 840 (1929); Jackiewicz v. United Illuminating Co., 106 Conn. 310, 138 Atl. 151 (1927); Wolczek v. Public Service Co., 342 Ill. 482,
174 N.E. 577 (1931); Zimmerman v. Weinroth, 272 Pa. 573, 116 Atl. 510 (1922); Notes, 6
U. Fla. L. Rev. 563, 565 (1953) ; 7 Stan. L. Rev. 97, 100-01 (1954).
112 Davis v. Renton, 113 Cal. App. 561, 298 Pac. 834 (1931); Florida Greyhound Lines v.
Jones, 60 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1952), Noted 6 U. Fla. L. Rev. 563 (1953) ; Metropolitan St. R.R.
v. Johnson, 90 Ga. 500, 16 S.E. 49 (1892); Consol. Coach Corp. v. Wright, 231 Ky. 731, 22
S.W.2d 108 (1929); Matloff v. City of Chelsea, 308 Mass. 134,31 NXE.2d 518 (1941); Wolfe v.
Kansas City, 334 Mo. 796, 68 S.W.2d 821 (1934) ; Bliss v. Beck, 80 Neb. 290, 114 N.W. 162
(1907). Cf. 151 AL.R. 479 (1944).
Cf., Zimmerman v. Weinroth, 272 Pa. 573, 116 AUt. 510 (1922), refusing to allow such
damages without proof of value of her services, and distinguishing therefrom the child's case.
113 Thus in Germ v. San Francisco, 99 Cal. App. 2d 404, 222 P.2d 122 (1950), plaintiff was
held entitled to damages for such loss on the basis of evidence showing his earnings for eight
years before the injury, although he was not working at that time, had recurring trouble
with alcoholism and had worked only intermittently. See also Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. R.R.
v. Perkins, 205 Ky. 798, 266 S.W. 652 (1924) (fact that his own firm had no work for plaintiff-salesman during incapacity did not preclude damages since he might have worked for
another firm); Pawlicki v. Detroit United Ry., 191 Mich. 536, 158 N.W. 162 (1916) (retired
shoemaker who was healthy and intended to set himself up in business held entitled to show
earnings when last employed and to recover for loss of earning capacity); Missouri, K. & T.
R.R. v. Flood, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 197, 79 S.W. 1106 (1904) (not working when injured);
Notes and Comments, 6 Okla. L. Rev. 289, 370 (1953) ; Restatement, Torts § 924, comment c
on clause (b) (1939).
114 Kline v. Santa Barbara Consol. Ry., 150 Cal. 741, 90 Pac. 125 (1907); Marshall v.
Smith, 131 Cal. App. 258, 21 P.2d 117 (1933).
115 Page 587 supra.
116 National Soda Prod. Co. v. Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 193, 143 P.2d 12 (1943); Orbach
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 233' Mass. 281, 123 N.E. 669 (1919); McCormick at 107;
Notes, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 317 (1950); 7 Stan. L. Rev. 97 (1954).
"17 Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. v. Hale, 186 Fed. 626 (8th Cir. 1911); Pretzer v. California
Transit Co., 211 Cal. 202, 294 Pac. 382 (1930); 'La Schia- o v. Northern Ohio Tr. Co., 106
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In such a case damages may be based on the reasonable cost of hiring a
substitute.18 Where the business is new or of a speculative character,
courts have been reluctant to admit evidence of its estimated yield,"'
although even here there should be no ironclad rule of exclusion and some
courts have allowed a showing to be made where the evidence is strong. 2 °
Other types of evidence besides past operating experience have been
received from time to time to show lost profits, including: the experience
of the trade or industry as a whole; ' opinions of experts acquainted with
the situation; 122 the fact that during the period in question competitors
had to turn away business;1 3 the experience of similarly situated firms
during the same period, 24 etc.
Medical and other expenses
Plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable cost of medical, surgical,
nursing, hospital, and other similar expenses incurred as a result of plaintiff's injury. This is true of such expenses already incurred at the time of
Ohio St. 61, 138 N.E. 372 (1922); McCormick at 311-12 (criticizing rule); 2 Sedgwick
§ 42a; 4 Sutherland 4692-96.
118 Lombardi v. California St. Ry., 124 Cal. 311, 57 Pac. 66 (1899); McCormick at 313;
Note, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 97, 107 (1954).
119 See, e.g., Restatement, Torts § 912 comment d, and illus. 10 (1939).
120 Thus in Treat v. Hiles, 81 Wis. 280, 50 N.W. 897 (1891), defendant breached his
agreement to open up and work a stone quarry on joint account with plaintiff. The evidence
showed that between the time of breach and the trial (about four years) the price of stone
had remained constant and the quarry had in fact been worked at a profit. The court held
this warranted a substantial verdict for loss of profits. But cf. Cramer v. Grand Rapids Show
Case Co., 223 N.Y. 63, 119 N.E. 227 (1918).
Damages have been allowed for preventing the expansion of an established business. In
Hoag v. Jenan, 86 Cal. App. 2d 556, 195 P.2d 451 (1948), plaintiff was allowed recovery for
loss of profits for breach of an agreement to build an extension on plaintiff's garage, measured by the probable increase in profits which the extension would have yielded. Plaintiff
showed that he was working to capacity and turning away business, the profit he made on
existing facilities for the period of default, and what extra volume and expenses the extension
would have involved.
See also Stott v. Johnston, 36 Cal. 2d 864, 229 P.2d 384 (1951) (damages allowed for probable increased profits painting contractor would have made during continued post-war building
boom); Jegen v. Berger, 77 Cal. App. 2d 1, 174 P.2d 489 (1946) (damages allowed for
probable increased profits from new laundry machinery).
121 In the Hoag and Stott cases, supra note 120, the general business conditions during
and following the war played a part. See Osterode v. Almquist, 89 Cal. App. 2d 15, 200
P.2d 169 (1948); also Skupen v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 33 Cal. App. 2d 392, 91 P.2d 910
(1939); Notes, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 320 (1950); 7 Stan. L. Rev. 97, 106 (1954).
122 Ellis v. Tone, 58 Cal. 289 (1881); Note, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 97, 106 (1954). Cf. Lester v.
Fox Film Corp., 114 S.C. 533, 104 S.E. 178 (1920).
123 Orbach v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 233 Mass. 281, 123 N.E. 669 (1919); cf. Hoag
v. Jenan, 86 Cal. App. 2d 556, 195 P.2d 451 (1948).
124 Osterode v. Ahnquist, 89 Cal. App. 2d 15, 200 P.2d 169 (1948) ; Orbach v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 233 Mass. 281, 123 N.E. 669 (1919); Note, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 97, 106 (1954).
Cf. Weinglass v. Gibson, 304 Pa. 203, 155 Atl. 439 (1931).
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trial' 2 5 and of estimated future expenses?2 6 As to past expenses, "the
proper measure is the reasonable value of such services, not the amount
paid or incurred therefor, although the amount paid or incurred would be
some evidence of value,'1 7 at least in the view of many courts. 2 ' Other
courts, however, hold that plaintiff has the burden of showing the charges
to be reasonable but proof of this can easily be supplied. 29 As to future
expenses, both their need and amount will usually have to rest on expert
opinion testimony. 130
Here again, as with loss of earnings, 13' the question may arise whether
plaintiff may recover for the expense of medical services which he has
neither paid for nor become obligated to pay for. Suppose, for instance,
they have been rendered by a member of the family, or their expense has
been met by the proceeds of an accident insurance policy or a medical
insurance plan, or they have been rendered at public expense. Many
courts lump all these situations together and apply the questionable and
undiscriminating "collateral source" rule so as to enable the plaintiff to
get more than compensation in these cases.132 Such a result is defensible
125 Alabama Freight Lines v. Thevenot, 68 Ariz. 260, 204 P.2d 1050 (1949); Rigley v.
Prior, 290 Mo. 10, 233 S.W. 828 (1921); McCormick § 90; Restatement, Torts § 924(c), and
comment f (1939).
128 Weadock v. Eagle Indemnity Co., 15 So. 2d 132 (La. App. 1943). See also cases and
material cited supra note 25.
127 Guerra v. Balestrieri, 127 Cal. App. 2d 511, 520, 274 P.2d 443, 448 (1954).
128 Dewhirst v. Leopold, 194 Cal. 424, 229 Pac. 30 (1924) (paid); Harris v. Los Angeles
Transit Lines, 111 Cal. App. 2d 593, 245 P.2d 35 (1952) (paid or incurred); Oliver v.
Weaver, 72 Colo. 540, 212 Pac. 978 (1923) (paid); Carangelo v. Nutmeg Farm, 115 Conn.
457, 162 At. 4 (1932) ; Williams v. Matlin, 328 Ill. App. 645, 66 N.E.2d 719 (1946) (paid);
Miller v. Mills, 257 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1953) (incurred).
129 Oliverius v. Wicks, 107 Neb. 821, 187 N.W. 73 (1922); Garafola v. Rosecliff Realty
Co., 24 NJ. Super. 28, 93 A.2d 608 (App. Div. 1952) ; Richardson & Holland, Inc. v. Owen,
148 Wash. 583, 269 Pac. 838 (1928).
The conflict is noted and cases collected in Note, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 151 (1928); Note, 82
A.L.R. 1325 (1933).
what might yet be
130 Dickey v. Jackson, 1 S.W.2d "577 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928) ...
needed and the amount of expense reasonably necessary to get it is a familiar subject of
expert estimation.").
131 See page 598 supra.
132 Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954) and Plank v. Summers, 203 Md.
522, 102 A.2d 262 (1954) (recovery allowed to include value of medical and hospital services
rendered without charge to veteran and serviceman respectively by naval hospital). Denver
& R.G. R.R. v. Lorentzen, 79 Fed. 291 (8th Cir. 1897); Roth v. Chatlos, 97 Conn. 282, 116
Ati. 332 (1922), noted, 31 Yale L.J. 776 (1922); Clark v. Berry Seed Co., 225 Iowa 262,
280 N.W. 505 (1938); Notes, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 280 (1940); 128 A.L.R. 686 (1940) (such
services rendered as gratuity). Dempsey v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 219 Fed. 619 (E.D. Pa.
1915); 95 A.L.R. 577 (1935) (accident insurance proceeds); 18 A.L.R. 678 (1922).
Gersick v. Shilling, 97 Cal. App. 2d 641, 218 P.2d 583 (1950); cf. Michigan Hosp. Service
v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954); 13 A.L.R.2d 355 (1950) (medical and
hospital expenses defrayed by blue cross plan).
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where the services represent a gift which the donor intended to be in addition to compensation. Otherwise the double recovery smacks more of
punishment to the wrongdoer than of efficient loss distribution in the
public interest." It is probably allowed by a majority of courts1 34 although the results in several cases support the more restrictive view. 3 5
In addition to expenses usually thought of as medical, plaintiff may have
reasonable compensation for such expenses as that of hiring a housekeeper 3

6

or taking a trip for health,' 3 7 if the need for such expense is

sufficiently related to the injury.
Another kind of loss which has a pecuniary aspect-although its measurement in those terms is pretty speculative-is diminution of the chance
to get married, especially in a girl or young woman. Where an injury is
disfiguring or in some other way likely to impair this chance, the jury will
be allowed to take this into consideration in awarding damages.' 38 The
impairment of a woman's ability to bear children may also be considered.'3 9
Pain, suffering, mental distress
All courts allow damages for conscious pain and suffering in personal
injury cases.' 4 These damages do not represent a pecuniary loss, yet in
theory they are "compensatory."'' It is a little hard to tell just what that
133 See James, "Social Insurance and Tort Liability; The Problem of Alternative Remedies," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. -537 (1952).
134 See note 132 supra.
135 City of Englewood v. Bryant, 100 Colo. 552, 68 P.2d 913 (1937) (medical expenses
furnished gratuitously either by county or hospital not to be included) ; DiLeo v. Dolinsky,
129 Conn. 203, 27 A.2d 126 (1942) (similar); Sedlock v. Trosper, 307 Ky. 369, 211 S.W.2d
147 (1948) (medical expenses met by contributory company plan something like blue cross,
not includable) ; Restatement, Torts § 924, comment f (1939).
138 If the injured person is a housewife, this item will be recoverable either in her own
suit or in her husband's, depending on local law. Astles v. Quaker City Bus. Co., 158 F.2d
979 (2d Cir. 1947) (Connecticut law); Rosenblatt v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 114, 120
(ED.
N.C. 1953) ; Berl v. Rochester States Corp., 14 N.Y.S.2d 516 (City Ct. Rochester 1939).
Cf. Note, 37 A.L.R.2d 364 (1954) (cost of hiring substitute).
137 McCormick 323. Cf. Tomey v. Dyson, 76 Cal. App. 2d 212, 172 P.2d 739 (1946)
(maintenance in convalescent home after discharge from hospital); Woodman v. Peck, 90
N.H. 292, 7 A.2d 251 (1939) (where injured child was removed to hospital in other town,
traveling expenses of parents to visit son held properly allowable).
138 Hunter v. Stewart, 47 Me. 419 (1859) (but such a consequence of injury not allowed
because not specially pleaded).
139 Cf. Note, 46 A.L.R. 1230, 1399 (1927); Bucktrot v. Partridge, 130 Okla. 122, 265 Pac.
768 (1928); Note, 102 A.L.R. 1125, 1516 (1936); Note, 16 A.L.R.2d 3335 (1951) (collecting
decisions passing on questions of excessiveness of verdicts involving injuries which interfere
with ability to bear children).
140 McCormick § 88; Restatement, Torts §§ 905, 924 (1939).
A critical and provocative treatment of the present problem appears in Zelermyer, "Damages
for Pain and Suffering," 6 Syracuse L. Rev. 27 (1954).
141 Ibid. See also Restatement, Torts § 912, comment b (1939).
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word means in this context. All agree that it does not mean the sum which
the plaintiff-or anyone else-would be willing to suffer the injury for.'4 2
Pain and suffering have no exchange value and there is no attempt to
equate them to anything like that. The matter is frankly committed in the
first instance to the sound discretion of the jury and the language of compensation has real significance only in framing instructions which are
calculated to put the jury in a proper frame of mind to exercise self-restraint, 143 and in furnishing an appropriate frame of reference for supervisory action by the court in cutting down verdicts felt to be excessive.'
Damages are allowed not only for past pain and suffering, but also for
that which is reasonably likely to result in the future from the injury. 45
There is no clear line of distinction between physical pain and mental
suffering, nor does the law insist on drawing one.' 46 Where there is no
physical impact or trauma the problem of liability itself may become complicated. 147 Given a bodily injury, however, damages will be allowed for
many forms of mental distress which result from or accompany the injury,
such as fear, 148 worry, 149 humiliation, 15 and functional mental disturb142 See, e.g., Alabam Freight Lines v. Thevenot, 68 Ariz. 260, 204. P.2d 1050 (1949);
Standard Oil Co. v. Shields, 58 Ariz. 239, 119 P.2d 116 (1941).
148 See McCormick at 318.
14- See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Shields, 58 Ariz. 239, 119 P.2d 116 (1941); St.
Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Brummett, 201 Ark. 53, 143 S.W.2d 555 (1940); Willis v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 352 Mo. 490, 178 S.W.2d 341 (1944); Burr v. Kansas City Pub. S.
Co., 276 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1955).
145 Cunningham v. Pennsylvania R.R., 55 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D.N.Y. 1944); Standard Oil Co.
v. Shields, 58 Ariz. 239, 119 P.2d 116 (1941); Purdy v. Swift & Co., 34 Cal. App. 2d
656, 94 P.2d 389 (1939) (permanent loss of senses of smell and taste) ; Burr v. Kansas City
Pub. S. Co., 276 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1955) ("pain, personal inconvenience and handicap" from
permanent injuries).
146 Birch v. United States, 220 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1955); Purdy v. Swift & Co., 34 Cal.
App. 2d 656, 94 P.2d 389 (1939); Boston v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d
326 (1945); Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co.,'339 Mo. 711, 98 S.W.2d 969 (1936); Berg v.
New York Society for Relief, 136 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954); Potere v.
Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1955)."
147 See James, "Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases," 47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 778, 789-96 (1953).
148 This may consist of fear accompanying the injury itself, as in Boston v. Chesapeake &
0. Ry., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326 (1945) and Potere v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112
A.2d 100 (1955), or of fear of the consequences, as in Berg v. New York Society for Relief,
136 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954); Halloran v. New England T. & T. Co., 95
Vt. 273, 115 Atl. 143 (1921).
But cf. Chicago RI. & P. Ry. v. Caple, 207 Ark. 52, 179 S.W.2d 151 (1944) (no recovery
for fear of injury before it happens).
'49 DeLoach v. Lanier, 125 F. Supp. 12 (N.D.Fla. 1954) (pregnant mother's worry lest
injury to her also injure fretus, which turned out to be groundess). Cf. Potere v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1955) (anxiety neurosis after second accident in which
ground collapsed under plaintiff).
150 Cunningham v. Pennsylvania R.R., 55 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D.N.Y. 1944); Abelmann v.
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ances. 151 Questions have arisen as to whether the jury should be told to
consider distress from inability to pursue vocations which enrich life
15 2
spiritually but not materially.
Effect of inflaiion
For the most part damages will naturally be assessed in terms of the
value money has at the time of those events, which become significant in
a lawsuit. If no particular attention is paid to the matter, the evidence
of past pecuniary loss will be related to wages when they were lost and
expenses when they were incurred. The jury will estimate the compensation for pain and suffering in terms of current dollars at the time of trial.
Future loss will represent a straight-line projection of comtemporary
values. If the economy is marked by gradually rising costs, verdicts based
on today's wages and costs and ideas of the value of money will naturally
tend to exceed verdicts of a decade or more ago. On the whole this sort
of thing will take care of itself. But there are several possible sources of
difficulty:
(1) If a long period has elapsed between the accident and the trial and a
material change in living costs has occurred during that time, plaintiff
may get paid in dollars that are worth less or more than those he lost when
he lost them, unless some adjustment is made.
(2) Where damages are awarded for future loss, there is the chance of
similar discrepancies between dollars awarded today and the value of
those dollars when they are drawn upon to fill future needs, unless the
future course of living costs is charted and the award adjusted to it.
(3) There is likely to be a cultural lag so that some jurors are not thinkOrmond, 53 Ga. App. 753, 187 S.E. 393 (1936); Panjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 339 Mo. 711,
98 S.W.2d 969 (1939).
151 DeLoach v. Lanier, 125 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Fla. 1954) (neurotic condition and "the
punishment she takes in attempting to correct the assumed injuries.") ; St. Louis Southwestern
Ry. v. Brummet, 201 Ark. 53, 143 S.W.2d 555 (1940) ("neuritis and neurosis"); Loewenthal
v. Mortimer, 125 Cal. App. 2d 636, 270 P.2d 942 (1954) (nervousness and disturbances of
nervous system); Potere v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1955) ("anxiety
neurosis").
Compare cases holding similar disturbances compensable under workmen's compensation
acts where they produce disability. Eaves v. Blaenclydach Colliery Co., [19091 2 K.B. 73;
Stride v. Southampton G.L. & Coke Co., 85 LJ. K.B. (ns.) 1449 (CA. 1916).
152 Variant decisions appear in Winter v. Pennsylvania R.R., 68 A.2d 513 (Del. Super.
1949); King's Indiana Billiard Co. v. Winters, 123 Ind. App. 110, 106 N.E.2d 713 (1952);
Northern Inaiana PS. Co. v. Robinson, 106 Ind. App. 210, 18 N.E.2d 933 (1939), 38 Mich.
L. Rev. 97 (1939); Hogan v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28 (1938),
13 So. Calif. L. Rev. 152 (1939); Greenwalt v. Nyhnis, 335 Mich. 76, 55 N.W.2d 736
(1952); Note, 120 A.L.R. 535 (1939).
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ing in terms of today's values but often in terms of those with which they
grew up.
(4) There is danger that courts will use outdated verdicts as standards
of comparison in performing their supervisory function. 5s
The last problem mentioned has had frequent recognition by the courts.
As far back as 1878 a New York court noted that "in making comparisons
of other cases with the present," it should consider "that the relative value
of money has diminished in recent times," and refused to set aside as
excessive a verdict of $14,000 for a broken leg resulting in permanent
injuries. 1 4 Frequently since that time courts have noted prevailing high 5
or low 156 price levels and distinguished verdicts rendered at other times
(when different price levels prevailed) which were urged on the courts as
comparisons in attempts to upset or sustain the amount of verdicts in the
cases being adjudicated.
The third problem has also been noted by the courts and there is wellnigh universal recognition that both courts and juries should take account
of well known and apparently more or less permanent changes in the
purchasing power of money. 15 7 Many courts would sanction a charge to
the jury in general terms to this effect. 3 8
Decisions dealing with the specific implications of such general notions
have been rarer. In a few cases the change in living costs between the
153 See analyses of the general problem in McCormick § 49; Notes, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 140
(1953); 48 Colum. L. Rev. 264 (1948); 26 Neb. L. Rev. 651 (1947); 2 Okla. L. Rev. 224
(1949).
154 Gale v. New York Central & H.R.R., 13 Hun 1, 4 (3d Dep't 1878), aff'd, 76 N.Y. 594
(1879).
155 Especially during the periods of inflation following the two world wars, the latter continuing. through the present time. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Johnston, 205 Ala. 1,. 87
So. 866 (1920); Posch v. Chicago Ry., 221 Ill. App. 241 (1919); Barnett v. Furst, 99 Cal.
App. 2d 767, 222 P.2d 470 (1950); Roeder v. Erie R.R., 164 N.Y. Supp. 167 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1917); Swanson v. J. L. Shiely Co., 234 Minn. 548, 48 N.W.2d 848 (1951);
Notes, 7 Ark. L. Rev. 140 (1953); 2 Okla. L. Rev. 224 (1949); cases collected in Note, 12
A.L.R.2d 611, 625 et seq. (1950).
158 Johnson v. St. Paul City Ry., 67 Minn. 260, 69 N.W. 900 (1897); cases collected in
Note, 26 Neb. L. Rev. 651, 652 (1947).
157 See, Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952); King's Indiana Billiard
Co. v. Winters, 123 Ind. App. 110, 106 N.E.2d 713 (1952); Morgan v. Kieppier, 60 So.2d
139 (La. App. 1952); cases cited in Note, 12 A.L.R.2d 611, 636 (1950). Contra, Palmer v.
Security Trust Co., 242 Mich. 163, 218 N.W. 677 (1928).
158 Halloran v. New England T. & T. Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 Atl. 143 (1921); Dabareiner v.
Weisfiog, 253 Wis. 23, 33 N.W.2d 220 (1948); cases collected in Note, 12 A.L.R.2d 611, 638
(1950). Cf. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Scott's Adm'r, 188 Ky. 99, 220 S.W. 1066 (1920); Fort
Worth & D.C. Ry. v. Gifford, 252 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). But cf. Hodkinson v.
Parker, 70 S.D. 272, 16 N.W.2d 924 (1944) (charge inviting consideration of "the present low
value of money and the high cost of living in arriving at the amount of future losses" held
properly refused). See note 159 infra.
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time past losses were incurred and the time of trial has been taken into
account, and the jury has been directed to award the present cash value
of such losses. 15 9
Greater confusion surrounds present damages for future loss. Future
trends in the value of money are necessarily unknown and so always
render such damages speculative in a way we cannot escape. If the
estimates represent a straight-line projection of present living costs, they
will be frustrated by fluctuations either way. If prophecy of change is
heeded, frustration will follow if no change, or the opposite change occurs.
When courts have consciously grappled with the problem they have either
found all prophecy too speculative and so, perforce, have taken the
equally speculative course of betting on a continuance of the status
quo;"'° or they have made intuitive and not always very wise judgments
that present conditions represent a departure from some imaginary norm
159 Tennessee River Nay. Co. v. Woodward, 18 Ala. App. 34, 88 So. 364 (1920) (requested
charge concerning medical bills forbidding jury to consider "any difference.., between the
purchasing power of a dollar at the time plaintiff expended it and at the present time," held
properly refused since it "does not correctly state the law.") ; Talbert v. Chicago, RI. & P.
Ry., 321 Mo. 1080, 15 S.W.2d 763 (1929) (where trial takes place eleven years after death
it is to be considered that: "Five thousand dollars in 1914 would have been worth much more
to the estate ...than $10,000 would have been in 1927, both on account of the lapse of time
and the decreasing value of the dollar."); Rigley v. Prior, 290 Mo. 10, 233 S.W. 828 (1921)
(where injury in 1914 and plaintiff largely recovered at time of trial, charge upheld that
damages would be "the present cash value of such sum in damages as ... will fairly and
reasonably compensate him for his mental and physical pain ... his medical expense ...
and his pecuniary loss, if any, resulting from any impairment . . .of his earning power.').
Cf. Halloran v. New England T. &T. Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 Atl. 143 (1921), in which argument
of counsel and charge by the court invited the jury to consider "the present impaired purchasing power of the dollar.' This was upheld, Watson, C. J., dissenting. It does not appear
from the report in this case when the injury occurred.
In accord with view taken here see also Note, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 264, 267-69 (1948).
Contra, Palmer v. Security Trust Co., 242 Mich. 163, 218 N.W. 677 (1928).
160 Armentrout v. Virginian Ry., 72 F. Supp. 997 (S.D. W.Va. 1947), rev'd on other
grounds, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Alabam Freight Lines v. Thevenot, 68 Ariz. 260, 204
P.2d 1050 (1949) ; Weadock v. Eagle Indemnity Co., 15 So.2d 132 (La. App. 1943) ; Henwood
v. Moore, 203 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). Cf. Edwards v. Southern Ry., 52 Ga. App.
557, 184 S.E. 370 (1936) ; Hodkinson v. Parker, 70 S.D. 272, 16 N.W.2d 924 (1944).
In the Armentrout case, the district court said:
It s possible, of course, that values may cease to be affected by inflation of the currency.
Economic conditions may conceivably cause the value of the dollar again to rise to the
point where it stood before the World War II. On the other hand there is no assurance
that its value may not become less as time goes on. This possibility balances, if it does
not outweigh the contrary forecast.
72 F. Supp. at 1001. In the Weadock case the court foresaw a continuation of the present
low purchasing power of money "with little or no prospect for any change, except probably
further decrease, for many years." 15 So. 2d at 146.
The cases cited in this note all specifically mention the problem of future dollar value in
relation to future losses. It should be noted that most of the cases cited note 109 supra involve future losses and tacitly invite computation of them in terms of current dollar values.
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to which they think we shall rapidly return.10' It is not at all clear that
courts would be willing to hear experts on the matter, or that they would
get much real help if they did. For the most part the problem-which
is inevitably present in every case of future loss-is not analyzed and the
present value of money is assumed to be the proper basis.
The problem is necessarily insoluble under the principle of the single
lump sum recovery. It could be approached with intelligent flexibility
under a system of periodic payments continuing for the duration of future
needs," 2 though such a system would pose other problems including a
greater administrative burden on courts and defendants.
Income tax exemption
The Internal Revenue Code lists as an exemption from gross income:
"The amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on
account of personal injuries or sickness.
..."' Thus all compensatory
damages in personal injury accident cases are tax exempt though they
often include compensation for loss of past and estimated future earnings
which would have been taxable if plaintiff had not been injured and had
been paid wages or salary. It has been suggested that "the treatment of
lost earnings is rooted in emotional and traditional, rather than logical,
factors." 6 We shall not here try to weigh the wisdom of the exemption.
Rather we shall take the exemption as our starting point and try to see
how it does and how it should affect the assessment of damages.
The first question is this: should the probable gross earnings, or estimated net income after taxes, be taken as the measure of recovery for loss
of earnings? The argument for computing damages on estimated income
after taxes is a clear one: this will measure the actual loss. If plaintiff
gets, in tax-free damages, an amount on which he would have had to pay
taxes if he had gotten it as wages, then plaintiff is getting more than he
lost.
Not many decisions treat this question explicitly. Most of those that do
consider it refuse to deduct taxes on the ground that future tax rates and
the way they may affect this particular plaintiff are too speculative. 16 5 It
161 Ill-starred guesses appear in Spell v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Fla. 1947)
("It is common knowledge that wages foi unskilled labor . . . were . . . much higher than
may be expected during normal times."); Calihan v. Yellow Cab Co., 125 Cal. App. 649,
13 P.2d 931 (1932) (court noted "signs of the country's gradual emergence from the depths
of the depression; we may expect a return to normal conditions.").
162 See suggestion in Note, 2 Okla. L. Rev. 224, 226 (1949).
163 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 104(a).
164 Harnett, "Torts and Taxes," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 614, 626 (1952) ; Note, 40 Cornell L.Q.
345,346 (1955).
165 Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Civil,
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has also been suggested that the tortfeasor ought not to get the benefit of
this exemption which comes from a "collateral source,"' 6 6 but this argument overlooks the compensatory theory of damages. 6 7 It is more forthright to say, as the Missouri court has, that the rule of compensation here
must yield to the practical difficulty of making a forecast. 68
Even in this form the argument is weak. In the first place it has no
proper application to damages for past losses. In measuring them, the tax
can be computed and should be deducted. 6 9 Moreover, future taxes are
no more speculative than are many other items that go into prophecies
about future losses in this uncertain world of ours-witness the future
earnings of a young child'7 0 or the future trends of the dollar's value.''
As long as our system stays wedded to the single lump sum recovery, our
courts simply have to speculate about the uncertainties of the future.
With anything as sure as "death and taxes," the courts are avoiding their
responsibilities when they decline to make the best guess they can once
all the reasonably available evidence has been brought before them. 7 2
The second question is whether the jury should be told about the
exemption. Even if taxes are not to be deducted in computing earning
loss, there is always danger that today's tax-conscious juries may assume
(mistakenly of course) that the judgment will be taxable and therefore
make their verdict big enough so that plaintiff would get what they think
he deserves after the imaginary tax is taken out of it. One court, in
recognition of this danger, sanctions an instruction to the jury that the
178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949); Cole v. Chicago St. P.M. & 0. Ry., 59 F. Supp. 443 (D. Minn.
1945); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., S 11.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952); Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582, 591
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953).; Notes, 33 B.U.L. Rev. 114 (1953); 32 Neb. L. Rev. 491 (1953); 4
Syracuse L. Rev. 350 (1953); 32 Tex. L. Rev. 108 (1953); 9 A.L.R.2d 311 (1950).
166

Notes, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 783 (1951); 33 B.U.L. Rev. 114 (1953).

167 See analysis in James, "Social Insurance and Tort Liability," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 537
(1952).
168 Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 345-46, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952):
... the general rule that an award of damages for loss of future earnings should be
based strictly on actual pecuniary loss cannot be rigidly adhered to insofar as it may
be impossible to compensate with reasonable accuracy the amount of income tax liability
that may attach thereto.
See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951).
169 None of the cases throws doubt on this proposition though none of them discusses it.
170 See notes 111, 112 supra. A similar problem appears in cases where a child has been
killpd. See Note, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 538 (1955).
171 See pages 605-08 supra.
172 In a very recent decision, the House of Lords decided that a trial court should take
probable income tax into account "in assessing that part of the damages attributable to loss
of earnings actual or prospective." British Transport Comm. v. Gourley [1956 2 Weekly L.R.
41 (H.L.).
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award is not subject to tax, and that they "... should not consider such
taxes in fixing the amount of any award made plaintiff....,173
IV.

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL

Statutory basis
The statutory origin of all rights of action on account of injuries which
result in death before a claim for them was compromised or reduced to
judgment is too well known to need comment. 7 4 Many of the original
statutes set a monetary limit on the amount to be recovered, and some of
these limitations still persist, though most have been raised while some
have been abandoned.1 7 5
From the point of view of one designing a rational, integrated system
for administering accident losses, limitations of this kind make no more
sense in death actions than in actions for personal injury. The injury to
survivors through death is just as real and at least as measurable as that
from personal injury, and in many situations calls just as loudly for redress. Whatever lay behind the original denial of remedy for death has no
continuing vitality-witness the wholesale repudiation of the original rule.
Statutory limitations against death actions sprang from the inhibitions and
suspicions that naturally marked the first break with the older view. They
have no proper place on the modern scene. This does not mean that discussion of possible limitations upon damages, either as to amount or kind
allowed, is out of place today. Much can be said, for instance, for rules
76
which tend to restrict damages to those that represent pecuniary loss.
Then, too, the times may call for restraint upon the broad discretion of
juries. But these needs, if they exist, warrant a broad re-evaluation of our
entire system of damages. Discrimination against death actions can be
justified, if at all, only on the basis that reforms that are equally needed
in the field of personal injury may be more difficult of accomplishment
there.
73 Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952). See Note, 21 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 156 (1953). Contra, Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77

(1955).
174 Holdsworth, "The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton," 32 L.Q. Rev. 430 (1916);
Harper, Torts § 279 (1933) ; Prosser, Torts § 105 (2d ed. 1955).
175 The statutes in effect in 1893 are listed and summarized in the Analytical Table,
Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act xvii (1st ed. 1893). The table shows restrictions on the
amount of recovery in 22 states, the amounts under general statutes ranging from $5,000 (a
common provision) to $20,000 (in Montana).
Contrast, 3 Martindale-Hubbell, Law Directory (Law Digests) (1955), showing that
virtually all states which have retained a limitation, set it at a higher figure than they did
in 1893, while many states (including Connecticut and New York) have abolished the
limitation.
176 See page 582-85 supra.
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The statutory origin of all civil claims for death has meant considerable
disparity among the patterns for measuring damages and we shall next
take up the principal ones to be found in this country.
Wrongful death acts measuring recovery by loss to survivors
Under statutes of this type there are some variations as to items of
damage allowable, though there is greater uniformity here than in the rest
of the field.
Pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries is regularly allowed. The method of
computing it is essentially similar to that used in cases of permanent injury, but probable future contributionsto the beneficiaries by the deceased
rather than his gross earningsare taken as the base. This brings into play
all the factors that must be considered in estimating the future earning
capacity of an injured living man. In addition it calls for weighing the
probable length of life (or of dependency) of the beneficiaries and the
decedent's probable future relationship towards them. As the Pennsylvania court has recently put it, the beneficiaries are entitled to the amount
of "the pecuniary loss . . . suffered [by them], that is to say, the present
Worth of the amount they probably would have received from his earnings
for their support during the period of his life expectancy and while the
family relationship continued between them, but without any allowance
for mental suffering, grief or loss of companionship. '177 If there is no
reasonable likelihood that the decedent would have contributed anything
to any of the designated survivors, then there can be no recovery on this
basis.1 78 If a beneficiary dies before trial, that event fixes the beneficiary's
loss to that sustained between the wrongful death and the beneficiary's
own death. 79 Funeral and medical expenses incurred by the decedent or
his estate are not properly included as part of the survivors' pecuniary
loss, 180 though they are sometimes specifically allowed by statute.1 8'
177 Ferne v. Chadderton, 363 Pa. 191, 197, 69 A.2d 104, 107 (1949).
178 Grasso v. State, 289 N.Y. 552, 43 N.E.2d 530 (1942); Liddie v. State, 190 Misc. 347,
75 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Ct. Cl. 1947). In these cases the decedents were incurable inmates of mental
institutions who would probably have made no pecuniary contribution to anyone.
Even if decedent had earnings or income, there could be no damages under this type of
statute if he was not likely to contribute anything to any member of the classes designated
by statute either by way of money or money's worth, or by way of advice, help, instruction,
and guidance. Lange v. Schoettler, 115 Cal. 388, 47 Pac. 139 (1896); Coliseum Motor Co.
v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 321-22, 3 P.2d 105, 112-13 (1931); see St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v.
Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 658 (1915).
179 Cooper v. Shore El. Co., 63 N.I.L. 558, 44 AUt. 633 (Ct. Err. &App. 1899); Dibble v.
Whipple, 281 N.Y. 247, 22 N.E.2d 358 (1939); Sider v. General El. Co., 238 N.Y. 14, 143
N.E. 792 (1924).
180 Gallup v. Sparks-Mundo Eng. Co., 43 Cal. 2d 1, 271 P.2d 34 (1954). At least unless
they are actually paid by the beneficiary and, according to some cases, only when he is under
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Statutes of the type described afford an eminently sound basis of recovery in the case of an adult, or one who "is old enough to have given a
clear indication of his pecuniary value to the beneficiaries."'8 2 The measure of recovery corresponds to the needs of living people which result
from the death and are capable of being met by money awards and it
involves as little in the way of speculation as the nature of the case allows.
Nothing is provided where there are no surviving dependents 8 ' or where
the survivors would have received nothing from the deceased had he
lived. 18 4 A more troublesome problem is presented by the death of a child
who is not employed and makes no present contributions to anyone. Although children were once no doubt economic assets to their parents, the
hard facts show fhat this is not generally so today. Moreover the annual
expense of rearing children tends to increase as they approach majority.'8 5
When earning capacity is finally realized, children become independent
and rear their own families. From a purely economic point of view the
young child of today is a net liability to his parents, however great a
potential economic asset he may be to society and to some family of the
future which has not yet come into being. The loss to the parents is inestimably great but it is not pecuniary. Nevertheless most courts permit
the award of substantial damages in such cases, 186 and the statutes of
several states make specific provision for recovery in case of a child's
death. 8 7 The stated justification is that juries may find the probable
a legal duty to make such payment. McCormick § 102; Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act
§ 157 (2d ed. 1913).
181 Dibble v. Whipple, 281 N.Y. 247, 22 N.E.2d 358 (1939); Ferne v. Chadderton, 363 Pa.
191, 69 A.2d 104, 107-08 (1949).
182 Comment, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 538, 541 (1955).
183 Webster v. Norwegian Min. Co., 137 Cal. 399, 70 Pac. 276 (1902); Vander Wegen v.
Great No. Ry., 114 Minn. 118, 130 N.W. 70 (1911) (applying Montana law); Smelser v.
Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 262 Mo. 25, 170 S.W. 1124 (1914) ; Brown v. Chicago & N.W. R.R.,
102 Wis. 137, 77 N.W. 748 (1898); Legislation, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 980, 981 (1931).
184 See note 178 supra.
185 Comment, 22 U. Cli. L. Rev. 538, 541 et seq. (1955).
186 See, e.g., Taylor v. Riggin, 40 Del. 149, 7 A.2d 903 (1939) (6 year old child); Blanchette v. Miles, 139 Me. 70, 27 A.2d 396 (1942) (12 year old child); Atkeson v. Jackson
Est., 72 Wash. 233, 130 Pac. 102 (1913) (2 year old girl whom parents intended to educate
through period of minority).
In many of the older cases the evidence shows a real basis for finding pecuniary loss by the
parents. See, e.g., Southern Indiana R.R. v. Moore, 34 Ind. App. 154, 72 N.E. 479 (1904).
And wherever there is such evidence, there is a basis for damages even under the strictest
attitude. Occasionally damages are refused in the absence of such a foundation in the evidence. Wilson v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 295 Pa. 168, 145 Atl. 81 (1929).
There is an extensive collection of cases in Note, 14 A.L.R.2d 485 (1950).
187 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.03 (1944) (recovery may be for loss of services and "such sum
for the mental pain and suffering of the . . .parents . . .as the jury may assess."). Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 30.010 (1953); Upchurch v. Hubbard, 29 Wash. 2d 559, 188 P.2d 82 (1947).
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value of the child's services (either for the balance of his minority or for
the balance of his life expectancy) though the nature of the case prevents
proof on the issue from being satisfactory. 188 This reasoning would be
sound enough if there generally were such net value. Since there is not,
the justification is a fiction which simply conceals the fact that damages
here are awarded for emotional distress under the guise of pecuniary loss.
Some courts allow damages for the diminution caused by death in the
amount which the beneficiary would probably have received from the
decedent by will or intestate succession.' 89 If it can be proven, this is
strictly a pecuniary loss.
Some courts, under statutes of the Lord Campbell's Act type, also allow
damages for the loss of the advice, help, instruction, and guidance (in
matters material, moral, and spiritual) which was reasonably to have been
expected by the beneficiaries from the decedent. 1 0 While such items are
not, perhaps, strictly pecuniary, their allowance seems fully justified even
under a functional view of damages, since this is the kind of loss for which
money can supply some sort of a practical substitute.
Strictly non-pecuniary losses are not, generally, sought to be redressed
by this kind of statute. Most courts do not allow damages for the grief
and emotional distress of the survivors, nor for their loss of the companionship, society, and affection of the decedent. 191 It is hard to distin188 Ihl v. Forty-Second St. & Grand St. Ferry R.R., 47 N.Y. 317 (1872); Kum v. Youngblood, 193 Okla. 299, 142 P.2d 983 (1943); Atrops v. Costello, 8 Wash. 149, 35 Pac. 620
(1894) ; Comment, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 538, 542 et seq. (1955) ; Note, 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 51619 (1950).
189 Pym v. Great Northern Ry., 2 Best & S. 759, 121 Eng. Rep. 1254 (Q.B. 1862), aff'd,
4 Best & S. 396, 122 Eng. Rep. 508 (Ex. Ch. 1863) ; see Meeking v. Brooklyn Hts. R.R., 164
N.Y. 145, 152, 58 N.E. 50, 52 (1900) ("...
. the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit,
by inheritance or otherwise... .); Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act §§ 159, 171 (2d ed.
1913) ; Note, 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 512 (1950).
190 Munro v. Pacific Coast D. & R.R., 84 Cal. 51'5, 24 Pac. 303 (1890); Butler v. Townsend, 50 Idaho 542, 298 Pac. 375 (1931); Evans v. Oregon S.- R.R., 37 Utah 431, 108 Pac.
638, 641 (1910); Pearson v. Picht, 184 Wash. 607, 52 P.2d 314 (1935); Coliseum Motor Co.
v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931).
191 Generally no allowance may be made for the mental anguish and distress caused to the
survivors by the death. Munro v. Pacific Coast D. & R.R., 84 Cal. 515, 24 Pac. 303 (1890);
Caldwell v. Abernethy, 321 N.C. 692, 58 S.E.2d 763 (1950) (Colorado law); Ferne v.
Chadderton, 363 Pa. 191, 69 A.2d 104 (1949); Blake v. Midland Ry., 18 A. & E. (ns.) 93
(Q.B. 1852); Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act § 154 (2d ed. 1913); Note, 14 A.L.R.2d 485,
495 (1950).
There is a fine line between advice, help, instruction, and guidance (which some courts
disallow) on the one hand, and some of the more nearly tangible aspects of solatium; yet all
the cases cited in note 190 supra seek to draw such a line. See also Note, 14 A.L.R.2d 485,
498-500 (1950).
A few states frankly allow damages for the "mental pain and suffering" of survivors. Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 768.03 (1944) (see note 187 supra); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Noell's Adm'r, 73
Va. 394 (1879) ; Morris' Adm'x v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 107 W. Va. 97, 147 S.E. 547 (1929).
See full discussion of various rules in Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 3 P.2d
105 (1931).
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guish such very real and deep losses from the physical pain and mental
distress of the plaintiff with bodily injury, 192 or the loss of consortium by
the spouse of a living but badly injured accident victim. 93 Under a compensatory view of damages perhaps all should be allowed; under a
functional view perhaps none should be. At a time when our underlying
philosophies of liability are in a state of flux, it is not surprising that the
line here is a ragged one. If the judicial trend is towards stricter liability
this should be accompanied by increasing recognition of a functional
theory of damages. This in turn would mean increasing reluctance to
extend notions of full compensation into new and questionable fields.
Quite consistent with the views here set forth is the refusal of most
courts to allow damages to the beneficiaries for the deceased's pain and
suffering, under the kind of statute here considered.'"
Wrongful deatk acts measuring recovery by loss to the estate
There are three different rules for measuring damages under this kind
of statute. 95 Some acts are construed as providing recovery for the
probable net earnings of the deceased after subtracting the amount he
would probably have spent on himself, all reduced to present worth.'9 6
This method most nearly approximates that under Lord Campbell's Act
and its progeny. Often the results will be the same, but there may be
differences. The statutes presently being considered will, for instance,
permit recovery where there are no survivors dependent on the deceased
or likely to have received any contribution from him."'
Other statutes of this type have been held to measure recovery by the
probable gross earnings of the deceased. 98 Obviously this method pro192 See page.603-05 supra.
193 See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852

(1950).
194 Oldfield v. New York & H. R.R., 14 N.Y. 310 (1865); Dimitroff v. State, 171 Misc.
635, 13 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Ct. of Claims 1939); Virginia Iron C. & C. Co. v. Odle's Adm'r, 129
Va. 280, 105 S.E. 107 (1920); ,Tiffany, Death by-Wrongful Act § 156 (2d ed. 1913); Note,
14 AJ-.R.2d 485, 500-02 (1950).
195 Such statutes are Ariz. Code Ann. §§ 31-101, 31-102 (1939); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.0"2
(1944) (when there are no surviving dependents); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.130 (1953); Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 30.020 (1953) (where there are no surviving dependents).
196 Dimitri v. Cienci & Son, 41 R.I. 393, 103 Atl. 1029 (1918). See Note, 39 Iowa L. Rev.
494 (1954).
197 Florida East Coast Ry. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914); Perham v. Portland
Gen. El. Co., 33 Ore. 451, 53 Pac. 14 (1898). Cf. Hansen v. Hayes, 175 Ore. 358, 154 P.2d
202 (1944).
198 Davis v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 147 Mich. 479, 111 N.W. 76 (1907); Olivier v.
Houghton County St. Ry., 134 Mich. 367, 96 N.W. 434 (1903). But cf. Baker v. Slack, 319
Mich. 703, 30 N.W.2d 403 (1948).
The approved charge in Kentucky is ambiguous on the point, viz.: the jury should award
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vides more than compensatory damages. 9 9
Still other statutes are construed as measuring recovery by the amount
deceased probably would have "earned and saved"' had he lived, that
is, by his probable accumulations. 2 °1 This perhaps most accurately reflects
the value of continued life to the decedent's estate, but it will fall far
short of providing compensation to the living dependents for their loss,
and this is the loss that calls loudest for redress. Moreover the gap will
prove greatest where the need is most acute-the typical case of the
breadwinner who spends most of his earnings on his dependents and therefore is able to save little.20 2
Under the theory of these statutes expenses incurred by the deceased
before his death are not properly included in an award of damages, since
these are to redress the injury caused by the death. 0 3 By the same
2 4
reasoning, funeral bills are properly included.
These statutes, like those patterned more closely after Lord Campbell's
Act, allow no damages for the deceased's pain and suffering, 05 and none
for the survivors' emotional distress.206
Survival statutes that supplement death acts
As we have seen, statutes like Lord Campbell's Act give no recovery
on account of the deceased's own interest in bodily integrity and continued existence.1 7 For that reason many states also have survival
statutes to provide damages measured by the deceased's own loss,20" viz.,
"such damages as [they] may believe from the evidence will reasonably and fairly compensate
decedent's estate for the destruction of his power to earn money.... ." Louisville & N. R.R.
v. Kenney's Adm'r, 162 Ky. 403, 172 S.W. 683, 686 (1915).
199 Gross earnings represent a proper basis of recovery in cases where the injured man
survives but is permanently disabled (see page 599 supra) for there his expenses continue.
200 Florida East Coast Ry. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 105, 64 So. 504, 505 (1914).
201 Arizona Binghampton Copper Co. v. Dickson, 22 Ariz. 163, 195 Pac. 538 (1921);
Perham v. Portland Gen. El. Co., 33 Ore. 451, 53 Pac. 14 (1898).
202 This was pointed out by the New Hampshire court in rejecting this measure. Imbriani

v. Anderson, 76 N.H. 491, 84 Atl. 974 (1912).
203 Square Deal Cartage Co. v. Smith's Adm'r, 307 Ky. 135, 210 S.W.2d 340 (1948) ; West
v. Nantz's Adm'r, 267 Ky. 113, 101 S.W.2d 673 (1937).
204 Potts v. Mulligan, 141 Fla. 376, 193 So. 305 (1940) ; Hansen v. Hayes, 175 Ore. 358,
184 P.2d 202 (1944). But cf. International Shoe Co. v. Hewitt, 123 Fla. 587, 167 So. 7 (1936).
205 Florida's East Coast Ry. v. Ha~es, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914); Square Deal
Cartage Co. v. Smith's Adm'r, 307 Ky. 135, 210 S.W.2d 340 (1948) ; Dimitri v. Cienci & Son,
4 RI. 393, 103 AUt. 1029 (1918); but cf. Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1955); Hooper
Constr. Co. v. Drake, 73 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1954) ; Fla. Laws, 1951, c. 26541 § 1.
206 McCabe v. Narragansett El. L. Co., 26 RI. 427, 59 AtI. 112 (1904). But cf. Triay v.
Seals, 92 Fla. 310, 109 So. 427 (1926); Southern Utilities Co. v. Davis, 83 Fla. 366, 92 So.
683 (1922).
207 See page 614 supra.
208 See Analytical Table, Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act xix (2d ed. 1913).
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his pain and suffering, the impairment of his earning power, and medical
and other expenses resulting from the injury, during the period between
the injury and death.20 9 Where death was instantaneous there can be no
recovery under such a statute.21 Recovery is for the benefit of the estate,
as such, and it does not matter whether there are surviving dependents. 1 1
These items do not duplicate those for which recovery may be had
under a wrongful death act. The latter provide recovery for the pecuniary
loss to survivors because of the death, and are measured from the time of
death; survival statutes afford remedies for losses during the period which
terminates with death. Only the survivors designated by statute receive
the fruits of an action for wrongful death; all beneficiaries of the estate,
including deceased's creditors, are entitled to the proceeds of an action
under survival statutes. -Both classes of beneficiaries have been harmed
by the death in different ways. For these reasons many states which have
both types of statutes allow separate recovery under each 112 A few such
jurisdictions, however, require an election between the remedies. 1- Such
a rule is hard to justify. While there may be some danger of duplicating
damages here, it can be avoided if care is used.
A more serious question is whether the social interest calls for full compensation of the loss redressed by survival statutes. As for the pecuniary
part of it, there seems little question. If there are surviving dependents,
they are themselves adversely (albeit indirectly) affected by the impairment of earning power and the expenses incurred before death. If there
209 Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1955); Ferne v. Chadderton, 363 Pa. 191, 69 A.2d
104 (1949); Livingston, "Survival of Tort Actions-A Proposal for California Legislation,"
37 Calif. L. Rev. 63 (1949); Leg. Doc. No. 60(E) at 448-58, N.Y. Report of Law Rev.
Comm'n 204-14 (1935).
210 Great Northern Ry. v. Capital Trust Co., 242 U.S. 144 (1916); Tiffany, Death by
Wrongful Act § 74 (2d ed. 1913).
211 See Davis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 53 Ark. 117, 126, 13 S.W. 801, 803 (1890)
(Under the survival statute "the administrator sues, as legal representative of the estate for
" Under the wrongful death act "he acts as trustee for
what belonged to the deceased ....
those upon whom the act confers the right of recovery for the pecuniary loss inflicted upon
them."); Stewart v. United El. L. & P. Co., 104 Md. 332, 65 Atl. 49 (1906) (The survival
action ".... is . . . devolved upon the executor or administrator, and, when ripened into a
judgment, becomes an asset of the decedent for the benefit of his creditors, if he has any, or
for the benefit of his legatees and distributees."); Brown v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 102 Wis.
137, 142, 77 N.W. 748, 750 (1898) (both rights of action "are dependent on the injury, but
only one dependent on the death with surviving relatives to take under the statute."). But
cf. Hopp's Est. v. Chesnut, 324 Mich. 256, 36 N.W.2d 908 (1949) (under survival provision
of F.E.L.A. proceeds are for benefit of named survivors).
212 Livingston, "Survival of Tort Actions--A Proposal for California Legislation," 37
Calif. L. Rev. 63 (1949).
213 Id. at 68; Chesapeake & 0. R.R. v. Bank's Adm'r, 142 Ky. 746, 135 S.W. 285 (1911);
Hackett v. Louisville, St. L. & T. P. Ry., 95 Ky. 236, 24 S.W. 871 (1894); Legislation, 44
Harv. L. Rev. 980 (1931).
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are no dependents, the deceased's creditors and perhaps other potential
beneficiaries of his estate are so affected. This is a pecuniary loss to the
living caused by the original injury, and one that is capable of being met
by money awards. The deceased's pain and suffering stand differently. It
has been urged: "The deceased bore the pain and suffering and he is the
only one who should be compensated. He can't take it with him. '214 And
indeed it is hard to justify a rule which "compensates" the living for a loss
they never had, and yet refuses to compensate them for their own emotional distress. A functional view of damages would preclude any award
for either item.2 15 Nevertheless most survival statutes are construed to
allow damages for deceased's pain and suffering.2 16
Survival statutes which stand alone
In some states the only basis of recovery for wrongful death is the
survival or revival statute. 1 7 In these states this statute is generally construed to permit recovery for damages resulting from the death itselfeven where instantaneous 2 18-- as well as those for the loss sustained by
deceased during his lifetime. 19 Such statutes therefore afford a remedy
Livingston, supra note 212 at 74.
215 See Jaffe, "Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance," 18 Law & Con214

temp. Prob. 219, 226 (1953).
In line with Livingston's suggestions (supra note 212) the California survival statute excludes "damages for pain, suffering or disfigurement." Cal. Civ. Code § 956 (Deering 1949).
216 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915) ; Davis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S.
Ry., 53 Ark. 117, 13 S.W. 801 (1890); Stewart v. United El. L. & P. Co., 104 Md. 332, 65
AUt. 49 (1906); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Laval, 131 N.J. Eq. 23, 23 A.2d 908 (Ch. 1942);
Murray v. Philadelphia Tr. Co., 359 Pa. 69, 58 A.2d 323 (1948); Johnson v. Eau Claire,
149 Wis. 194, 135 N.W. 481 (1912); Schumacher, "Rights of Action Under Death and
Survival Statutes," 23 Mich. L. Rev. 114, 117, 134 (1924).
A recent listing of survival statutes appears in Livingston, supra note 212 at 65-66 n.l1.
217 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2428(c) (Supp. 1951), abolishing monetary limitation on action
formerly provided by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8296 (1949) ; Iowa Code 1 611.20 (1954) ; cf. N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 556.0 et seq. (1955) (particularly § 556.12); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-607
et seq. (1955). See Note, 39 Iowa L. Rev. 494 (1954). The history of New Hampshire legislation is recounted in Pitman v. Merriman, 80 N.H. 295, 117 At. 18 (1922) ; Piper v. Boston
& M. R.R., 75 N.H. 453, 75 At. 1041 (1910).
218 Broughel v. Southern N.E. Tel. Co., 73 Conn. 614, 48 Atl. 751 (1901) (containing also
a history of Connecticut legislation); Hough v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 169 Iowa 224, 149 N.W.
885 (1914) ; Nashville & C. R.R. v. Prince, 49 Tenn. 580 (1870).
219 McKirdy v. Cascio, 142 Conn. 80, 111 A.2d 555 (1955); Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132
Conn. 461, 45 A.2d 789 (1946) ; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 556.12 (factors to be considered in
measuring damages include mental and physical pain suffered by deceased, reasonable expenses "occasioned to the estate by the injury, the probable duration of his life but for the
injury, and his capacity to earn money ....
"); Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-614 (1955) (mental
and physical suffering, loss of time, expenses, of deceased; also damages resulting to parties
for whose use and benefit the right survives).
In Iowa the pain and suffering of the deceased are not elements of damage in an action
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very much like that afforded by a combination of a wrongful death and a
survival statute (where recoveries under both are allowed).
Damages for the death under such statutes are measured by one of the
above described methods applicable to wrongful death acts that measure
220
the recovery by the loss to the estate.
Statutes providing recovery by way of a penalty
While several of the earlier statutes involved the notion of a penalty,221
the tendency on the part of courts 222 and legislatures2 23 has been away

from this notion. Massachusetts is the outstanding exception.224 There,
. . . all the death statutes have this common, uniform and unaltered characteristic that the amount recoverable is fixed, not on the theory of compensating the surviving relatives of the deceased, but solely on the basis of the
quantity of guilt of the defendant under the circumstances of the killing.225
The purpose of these statutes is "to punish those who through negligence
cause the death of a human being... .26 Whatever can be said for the
desirability and effectiveness of punishment ought not, it is submitted, to
begun by his administrator after his death. Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22, 47-48
(N.D. Iowa 1948) ; Boyle v. Bernholtz, 224 Iowa 90, 275 N.W. 479 (1937).
220 Thus the damages to the estate are measured in Connecticut and New Hampshire by
the probable net earnings of the deceased but for the death, McKirdy v. Cascio, 142 Conn.
80, 111 A.2d 555 (1955); Pittman v. Merriman, 80 N.H. 295, 117 Atl. 18, 26 A.L.R. 589
(1922), reduced to present worth. Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 451, 45 A.2d 789 (1946).
In Iowa the measure is the "present worth or value of that which the decedent would
reasonably be expected to save and accumulate if he had lived out the natural term of his
life." Jettre v. Healy, 245 Iowa 294, 60 N.W.2d 541, 546 (1953).
Analyses of the measure of damages in Iowa may. be found in Jones, "Civil Liability for
Wrongful Death," 10 Iowa L. Bull. 169 (1925) and 11 Iowa L. Rev. 29 (1925); Note,
"Measure of Damages for the Wrongful Death of the Head of a Family in Iowa," 39 Iowa
L. Rev. 494 (1954). An analysis of the situation in Tennessee may be found in Gamble,
"Actions for Wrongful Death in Tennessee," 4 Vand. L. Rev. 289 (1950).
221 See Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act xvii et seq. (Analytical Table) c. IX (1st ed.
1893) listing as providing forfeitures the statutes of Alabama, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, and New Mexico.
222 See, Pitman v. Merriman, 80 N.H. 295, 117 At. 18 (1922); Piper v. Boston & M.
R.R., 75 N.H. 453, 75 Atl. 1041 (1910).
223 Compare note 221 supra with Quill, "A Note on the Advisability of Changing the
Massachusetts Death Statute," 23 B.UL. Rev. 434 (1943), noting that only Alabama and
Massachusetts still regarded their statutes as punitive.
224 Mass. Gen. L. c. 229 (1932), as amended Mass. Acts & Res., 1949, c. 427; Mass. Acts
& Res., 1951, c. 250.
Alabama has from the beginning construed her statutory language (viz. "such damages as
the jury may assess," in a statute passed for the express purpose of preventing homicide) as
punitive so as to be proportioned to the degree of culpability. Brown v. Southeastern Greyhound lines, 255 Ala. 308, 51 So. 2d 524 (1951); Richmond & D. R.R. v. Freeman, 97 Ala.
289, 11 So. 800 (1892) ; Savannah & M. R.R. v. Shearer, 58 Ala. 672 (1877).
225 Porter v. Sorell, 280 Mass. 457, 460, 182 N.E. 837, 838 (1932).
226 Id. at 461, 182 N.E. at 839.
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confuse and obfuscate the question of how accident victims should be
compensated.

227

227 See Quill, "A Note on the Advisability of Changing the Massachusetts Death Statutes,"
23 B.U.L. Rev. 434 (1943); "New Statutes," 34 Mass. L.Q. No. 4 at 3 (1949). The latter
citation refers to a brief excursion made by the Massachusetts legislature into the fields of a
compensatory wrongful death act. See Mass. Acts & Res. 1946, c. 614; Mass. Acts & Res.,
1947, c. 506. The act of 1946 was "passed in a hurry about midnight on the last day of the
session." It added to the "degree of culpability" clauses the words "and with references to
the pecuniary loss. . . ." of beneficiaries, thus making two "concurrent and consequently
vague and confusing standards of damages." 34 Mass. L.Q. No. 4, at 3 (1949). The 1947
act struck out the "degree of culpability" language and left only the reference to compensation. The language at this point was capable of intelligent interpretation along the lines of
Lord Campbell's Act. See Note, 28 B.U.L. Rev. 368 (1948). In 1949, however, the legislature
beat a hasty retreat, jettisoning all reference to compensation and returning to the old familiar
standard of "degree of culpability." Mass. Acts & Res., 1949, c. 427.

